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DECENTRALIZING FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEARCH DOCTRINE
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer'
ABSTRACT
In examining the threshold question for Fourth Amendment analysis-what
constitutes a search?-both courts and commentators have generally premised
their analysis on a sharp dichotomy between an approach based on trespass to real
or personal property, on the one hand and one grounded in non-property-based
expectations of privacy, on the other. The trespass-based regime seemed to have
given way in 1967 to the "reasonable xpectation of privacy" standard But the
resurgence of a trespass-based approach in recent Supreme Court cases has served
to highlight the supposed istinction between the two methodologies.
When subjected to close scrutiny, the dichotomy between the two approaches
becomes highly questionable. Whether analyzed in terms of trespass or reasonable
expectations of privacy, the question in close cases concerning whether
government conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment search comes down to the
same essential touchstone: social norms governing security in one's person and
property from intrusion by others. Those social norms inform both when a
particular expectation of privacy should be deemed reasonable and when an
incursion on property should be deemed a trespass. This social-norm-based
analysis of whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred should not be
surprising. The common law governing rights to security in one's person and
property stems from longstanding custom, which is inextricably linked with social
norms: the practices of a people become their social norms, which harden into
custom, and custom in turn evolves into enforceable rights and interests that
sometimes, though not always, find expression in positive law. Thus, expectations
of privacy and trespass constitute, not two distinct tests, but rather two points on
the same evolutionary scale. Our notions of trespass have as their touchstone the
' Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University. I thank the
following for their helpful comments on earlier iterations of this Article: Will Baude, Will Berry,
Russell Christopher, Brenner Fissell, Steve Henderson, Craig Konnoth, James Stern, Matt Tokson, and
participants of the 2016 CrimFest! Conference, the 2017 Federalist Society Annual Faculty Conference,
and workshops at the University of Kentucky College of Law and the Salmon P. Chase College of Law,
Northern Kentucky University.
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very same social norms that form the backbone of the reasonable xpectation of
privacy test.
One can articulate a uniform meaning of "search " irrespective of whether we
are operating under a "trespass" or a "reasonable xpectation of privacy" model.
A Fourth Amendment search occurs when, for the purpose of gathering
information, government agents act contrary to law, broadly conceived-that is,
law in whatever stage of evolutionary development-providing us with security
vis-a-vis private actors in our "persons, houses, papers, and effects." A violation
of positive law that fits this definition is sufficient but not necessary to constitute a
Fourth Amendment search; a violation of social norms that fits this definition, even
where the norms have not yet gelled into positive law, should also be considered a
search. But because law, in all its manfestations, often differs by jurisdiction, the
question whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred might be answered
dsferently in dfferent parts of the country, and perhaps even in diferent parts of
the same State.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the conventional wisdom, the doctrine on the threshold question
of Fourth Amendment inquiry-what is a "search?"-has wavered back and forth
between a property-based "trespass" approach and a privacy-based "expectations"
approach. On this view, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United
States in 1967, courts determined whether a Fourth Amendment search had
occurred with reference to common-law notions of trespass: a search had occurred
if, but only if, government agents committed a physical intrusion into one of the
four interests enumerated in the Amendment-persons, houses, papers, or effects.2
In Katz, the Court reversed course, seemingly burying the trespass approach and
creating an altogether new methodology, the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test.' Under this approach, a Fourth Amendment search occurs if, but only if,
government agents infringed upon a person's expectation of privacy, and if society
is prepared to consider that expectation a reasonable one.' In United States v.
Jones, in 2012, the Court revived the trespass test, so that a Fourth Amendment
search occurs as long as either test is satisfied.'
This is the conventional wisdom. As a historical matter, the conventional
wisdom is questionable.' But more importantly, this sharp dichotomy between the
two approaches is conceptually flawed. The common law, upon which the trespass
approach is based, is itself only the end product of centuries of accumulation of
custom which has created enforceable rights and interests, even before those rights
and interests are expressed in statutory or decisional form as positive law. Custom,
in turn, is simply a hardening of social norms that reflect the repeated practices of a
people forced to navigate the complex relationships between individual and
community. And it is those very same social norms that form the backbone of the
reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Thus, questions about both reasonable expectations of privacy and unwanted
physical intrusions have at their root social conventions governing how individuals
interact with one another and the extent to which we ought to respect each other's
interest in security against intrusions on our persons and property. Sometimes these
social conventions have ripened into positive law and sometimes they have not.
When they have, they are expressed in the common law of trespass (among other
areas), on which the Court's physical intrusion approach hinges. When they have
not, these social conventions may remain at the level of social norms, which are at
the heart of the reasonable expectation of privacy approach. And there is a vast,
blurry middle ground, where social norms have evolved into enforceable rights and
2 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1967).
' See id at 360 (Harlan, J. concurring). Although the standard stems from Justice Harlan's
concurrence in Katz, the Court quickly adopted it See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
4 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
s United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409-11 (2012).
6 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SuP. Cr.
REv. 67 (arguing that no trespass test was actually used in the pre-Katz era, thus making its "revival" in
Jones questionable).
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interests-have become law-although they have not been expressed as such by
any legislature or court.
This Article argues that the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test derived
from Katz and the "physical intrusion" test developed prior to Katz and used most
recently in Jones and Florida v. Jardines7 are not distinct tests at all but are instead
two different manifestations of the same essential touchstone: social norms
governing security against intrusions on our persons and property. The Article
proposes a unified test for whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred: a
Fourth Amendment search occurs when, for the purpose of gathering information,
government agents act contrary to law, broadly conceived-that is, law in whatever
stage of evolutionary development-protecting us from intrusion by private actors
in our persons, houses, papers, and effects. But a mere violation of social norms is
insufficient to make out a search. To provide some much-needed clarity to Fourth
Amendment law, those norms must have evolved to the point of providing legally
enforceable rights in order for a search to have occurred. Like all law, this
determination will sometimes differ from state to state, and, at least in close cases,
juries will have to make the determination of whether norms have hardened into
enforceable law. Thus, this Article also proposes that Fourth Amendment search
doctrine be decentralized.
This Article is partly descriptive and partly prescriptive. By providing a new
way of looking at the two different articulations of the Fourth Amendment search
inquiry, it shows what the Court has already done. And after laying bare the
common denominator of these two approaches, social norms that form the basis of
law, it argues for changes to the way we determine whether a Fourth Amendment
search has occurred, in order to make that determination more consistent with this
underlying premise of Fourth Amendment law.
le Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the history of Fourth
Amendment search doctrine, from the supposed reliance on trespass principles, to
Katz's articulation of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, to the more recent
reintroduction of trespass principles into the doctrine. Part II offers a synthesis of
the two different approaches by demonstrating that these two approaches are
actually two manifestations of the same touchstone: social norms governing
security against private intrusions on our persons and our property. The Fourth
Amendment was understood at the time of its adoption as imposing common-law
rules on governmental agents in searching and seizing. But those common-law
rules spring from social custom and usage that evince widely shared social norms.
This evolution from practice to norm to custom to positive law is not merely of
historical importance. Modem scholarship on social norms demonstrates that these
norms can be as powerful a force as positive law in guiding and restraining
behavior. Moreover, on occasion these norms still evolve into enforceable legal
rights and interests that have not yet solidified into statutory or decisional law. Part
1H raises two implications of using as the touchstone of a Fourth Amendment
"search" social norms regarding security against private intrusions on persons and
7 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
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property. First, that government action violates positive law in an effort to access
information is sufficient, but not necessary, to make out a Fourth Amendment
search. Second, given the granularity of social norms, the custom and usage that
these norms generate, and the positive law that ultimately springs from custom and
usage, a decentralized rather than monolithic approach to Fourth Amendment
search doctrine is called for.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH DOCTRINE(S)
Conventionally understood, Fourth Amendment search doctrine has developed
in three distinct stages. First, the Court tied the concept of a Fourth Amendment
search to the common-law concept of trespass: a trespass, but only a trespass, could
constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Next, the Court decoupled the
trespass basis for search doctrine, replacing it with the touchstone of the
"reasonable expectation of privacy," such that a technical common-law trespass
was neither necessary nor sufficient to constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
Finally, and most recently, the Court has added back in the notion that a trespass
can constitute a search, so that a search occurs where there is an unlicensed
physical intrusion or an infringement of one's reasonable expectation of privacy.
It is important to keep in mind that that these approaches are used to determine
only whether a search has occurred, not whether the search is reasonable. Where
police do only what other private citizens may do, they have not implicated the
Fourth Amendment. When they go beyond what private citizens may do, they may
still be in the right, but they need some special dispensation to do so, typically in
the form of a specific warrant or warrant-substitute. Thus, it makes sense that under
both approaches, the line separating searches from non-searches is the behavior we
expect from other private citizens regarding our security in our persons and
property.
A. FROMOLMSTEAD 7 KATZ
Most conventional expositions of Fourth Amendment search doctrine begin
with Olmstead v. United States.' There, a number of people were convicted of
conspiring to violate the National Prohibition Act in Washington State.9 The
government had gathered information about the conspiracy by tapping the phone
lines of the homes of four of its members and the office where they plied their
illegal trade, and listening in on telephone conversations.'o The taps were made in
the basement of the building where the office was located and "in the streets near
the houses."" The taps were conducted, the Court took pains to tell us, "without
trespass upon any property of the defendants."2 The Court held that the Fourth
8 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9 d at 455.
'old at 456-57.
" Id at 457.
12id
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Amendment was not implicated because there was no search or seizure, given that
"[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."" That the
wiretapping was a criminal offense in Washington was of no moment.'4 As the
Court put it, "clearly a [state] statute . . . can not affect the rules of evidence
applicable in courts of the United States."'5
Subsequent cases seemed to hinge, in large part, on whether government agents
had committed a trespass in investigating crime. Take, for example, the classic
dyad of Goldman v. United States" and Silverman v. United States." In Goldman,
federal agents lawfully present in an office building, pressed up against the wall to
an adjoining office a "detectaphone," which could pick up soundwaves from the
other office, and listened in to conversations taking place there.'" Although the
agents had also installed a listening apparatus within a wall between the two
offices, that apparatus failed to work." The Court held that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation.20 Rejecting the defendants' argument that one who speaks in
an office does not assume the risk that his voice will be picked up by a delicate
listening instrument in an adjoining office, the Court reasoned opaquely that "the
distinction is too nice for practical application of the Constitutional guarantee," and
that Olmstead was essentially indistinguishable.2' The Court also held that, to the
extent there was a trespass into the office to plant the within-the-wall device, there
was an insufficient connection between such a trespass and the eventual gathering
of evidence, given that that device did not work.
By contrast, in Silverman, which also involved the gathering of evidence by use
of a listening device, the Court found a Fourth Amendment violation.' The device
there was a "spike mike," a microphone attached to a fbot-long spike.2 4 It was
inserted into a wall separating a vacant row house, where the officers were legally
present, from its neighbor, occupied by the defendants, and touching "a heating
duct serving the [latter] house." In that way, officers were able to listen in on
conversations taking place in that house.26 The Fourth Amendment was offended
because "the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an unauthorized
physical penetration into the premises,"27 transforming the heating duct into "a
giant microphone." The case was unlike Olmstead and Goldman because, in those
11 Id at 464.
4 See id at 468-69.
"ld at469.
16 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
1 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
` Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131-32.
19 Id at 131.
0 Id at 135.
21 ld
2 See id at 134-35.
' See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961).
24 Id at 506.
2 Id at 506-07.
2 Id at 507.
2 Id at 509.
a Id (quoting Silvennan v. United States, 275 F.2d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
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cases, the eavesdropping had taken place without "an unauthorized physical
encroachment within a constitutionally protected area."29 In Silverman, by contrast,
the police had essentially converted for their own use-"usurp[ed]," as the Court
put it-the heating system, "an integral part of the premises" without the
occupants' consent.30
The extent to which these earlier cases relied on notions of trespass, however,
has been vastly overstated. Goldman, for example, did not mention trespass at all,
except in putting to one side the earlier, ancillary intrusion into one defendant's
office which did not lead to the gathering of any evidence.3 ' Even Silverman,
which seems most clearly to equate physical intrusion with a Fourth Amendment
search, went out of its way to distance the constitutional inquiry from one focusing
on "whether or not there was a technical trespass under the local property law."'
Further, it cautioned that the Fourth Amendment search question was "not
inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law." 3
The decision distinguished between "the technicality of a trespass ... as a matter of
local law" and "the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area."
34
That the Fourth Amendment search question did not precisely track the
common law of trespass is most clearly seen in the pre-Katz spy cases. In a series
of cases, the Supreme Court confronted the question whether the Fourth
Amendment was implicated when government agents, by means of deception, seek
information from a confidante of the target. In Hoffa v. United States, the
government relied on testimony by a government informant, who had befriended
the defendants, about statements the defendants had made to him while in a hotel
suite occupied by one of them." In Lewis v. United States, the government
similarly offered testimony of an undercover narcotics agent who, posing as a drug
buyer, was twice invited by the defendant into his home to conduct a drug
transaction.36 In Lopez v. United States, an Internal Revenue Agent feigned interest
in receiving a bribe offered by the defendant and secretly recorded a conversation
that took place in the defendant's office in which the defendant offered him a
bribe." And in On Lee v. United States, Chin Poy, a supposed friend of On Lee,
had entered the latter's business premises, surreptitiously wired with an electronic
listening device, and had prompted him to make incriminating statements, which
2 9Id at 510-11.
3 Id at 511.
1 See Kerr, supra note 6, at 82-83.
nSilverman,365 U.S. at 511.
3 Id; see also Kerr, supra note 6, at 85.
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512; see also id at 513 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Our concern should not
be with the trivialities of the local law of trespass, as the opinion of the Court indicates.").
" Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 296-98 (1966). It was unclear whether the informant acted
on his own initiative after having befriended the defendants, or instead was inserted into the defendants'
midst by the government for the purpose of gathering evidence. See id at 298-99. Ultimately, the Court
determined that it did not matter which of the two actually occurred. Id at 299.
' Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 207 (1966).
3 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 429-32 (1963).
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were overheard through the device, and later testified to, by a federal agent."
Given the facts in these cases, one might expect that the Court would have relied
upon one of two related trespass theories: either that entry into premises gained
through deception constitutes a trespass, on the theory that deception vitiates
whatever license the trespasser otherwise might have;" or on the hoary "trespass
ab initio" doctrine, that an unlawful act following a lawful entry renders the entry
retroactively unlawful from its inception."'
Yet, in none of these cases did the Court find a Fourth Amendment violation,
much less on the basis of the common law of trespass. In Hoifa, the Court's
characterization of the defendants' argument was that the informer's deception
"vitiated the[ir] consent" to entry, but held, without reference to the law of trespass,
that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.4 ' In Lewis, the Court characterized
the defendant's argument similarly, rejecting his contention that consent to enter
his home "was induced by fraud and deception."42 In Lopez, the Court rejected the
defendant's argument that the agent was "guilty of an unlawful invasion of
[defendant's] office simply because his apparent willingness to accept a bribe was
not real," and held that surreptitious recording was not a search because it was not
accomplished through a device "planted by an unlawful physical invasion of a
constitutionally protected area."'
Only in On Lee did the Court engage in any discussion of the law of trespass.
On Lee invoked the trespass ab initio doctrine, claiming that Chin Poy's conduct in
secretly transmitting their conversation "vitiated the consent and rendered his entry
a trespass ab initio."4 He claimed also that the consent was invalid because it was
"obtained by fraud"45 The Court rejected these claims. First, it wrote that it was
unclear whether the purely passive deception, absent "any affirmative
misrepresentation, would be a trespass under orthodox tort law."" More
fundamentally, however, the Court rejected the idea that "the niceties of tort law[,]"
with its "fine-spun doctrines[,]" govern the Fourth Amendment search question.47
Indeed, the Court noted that it had already rejected the trespass ab initio doctrine
twenty-five years earlier.48
- On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749-50 (1952).
3See generally Laurent Sacharoff Trespass and Deception, 2015 BYU L. REv. 359 (discussing the
extent to which deception by police to gain entry to private spaces constitutes trespass, triggering Fourth
Amendment protections).
4 See The Six Carpenters' Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 695, 696; 8 Co. Rep. 146, 146.
4' Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300-02 (1966).
4 Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,208-11 (1966).
' Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963); see also id at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[TJho Court has refused to crowd the Fourth Amendment into the mold of local property law.").
" On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751-52 (1952).
4s Id at 752.
4 Id
a Id (citing McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 98 (1927)). In McGuire, federal agents serving
a warrant on a premises lawfully seized liquor as evidence of a violation of the National Prohibition Act
but unlawfully destroyed other liquor. McGuire, 273 U.S. at 96-97. The Court rejected the contention
that the unlawful act rendered the entry a trespass ab initio, thus tainting with illegality the surviving
liquor. Id at 98-100; see also Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 629 (1946) (where FBI agents were
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Thus, prior to 1967, the Court's methodology in determining the Fourth
Amendment search question was less than clear. In some cases, such as Silverman,
it relied on the fact of a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected space to
find a constitutional violation. But it also eschewed reliance in that case and in
others on any "technical" or "fine spun" law of trespass.4 9 The formulation in Katz
of the 'reasonable expectation of privacy" test, then, in some sense clarified rather
than revolutionized Fourth Amendment search doctrine. One thing that is clear
about the pre-Katz era is that, to whatever extent the Court calibrated Fourth
Amendment search doctrine to physical intrusion, it was applying a general
trespass-like analysis, not the actual law of trespass.
B. Katz's "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test
Modem Fourth Amendment search doctrine begins, of course, with Katz v.
United States. Katz was convicted of several federal gambling offenses based in
part on statements he made while making a phone call from a public telephone
booth."o The statements were overheard by federal agents via an electronic listening
device they had attached to the outside of the booth.s" Were the Court to adhere to
its prior decisions, it would have had to have held that no search had occurred.
After all, if agents did not perform a search when they attached a listening device to
the wall separating Goldman's office from one to which they had lawful access, a
fortiori no search occurred where the device was attached to the outside of a public
phone booth.
Instead, the Court overruled both Goldman and Olmstead,52 and forged a new
path. The Court focused on the assumptions and expectations that people entertain
regarding the retention or abandonment of privacy when they act in certain ways.
As the Court put it: "One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast o the world."53
Or, as Justice Harlan put it in his concurrence, in a formulation that later assumed
the status of controlling law: 'IT]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation of privacy be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."'54 The first prong is virtually always satisfied5
lawfiully present at suspect's place of business and gained lawfiu access to his records, their arguably
unlawfiul seizure of one document did not rendor them "trespassers ab initio").
" See Kerr, supra note 6, at 84-85 (observing that, prior to Katz, "physical penetration into a
protected space [w]as the primary test for a Fourth Amendment scarch," but that the Cout distinguished
between searches and trespass).
' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,348 (1967).
~Id
SId at 353 ("[T]he underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as
controlling.").
53 Id at 352.
' Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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so that, for all intents and purposes, the test is whether the government
breached a reasonable-sometimes characterized as a "justifiable"' or
"legitimate" -expectation of privacy.
In applying this standard across a variety of different contexts, the Court has
established a number of guideposts. First, in keeping with the break with the past
augured by Katz, a physical intrusion into private property is neither necessary nor
sufficient for there to be a Fourth Amendment search. For example, in Kyllo v.
United States, suspecting Kyllo of growing marijuana in his home with the use of
"grow lights," police used a thermal-imaging device in order to detect the relative
amounts of heat emanating from different parts of his home." Despite the absence
of a physical intrusion, the Court held that the use of sense-enhancement
technology to reveal details about the inside of a home that could otherwise not
have been obtained absent a physical intrusion constitutes a search, at least as long
as the technology "is not in general public use."'
Conversely, in United States v. Dunn and Oliver v. United States, law
enforcement agents discovered incriminating evidence by making a warrantless
entry onto the defendants' extensive properties, in each case outside the curtilage of
the houses." Despite the trespasses in each case, the Court held that there was no
Fourth Amendment search, in part because a person has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in activity taking place in "open fields."' The Court specifically
rejected the notion that a common-law trespass i a Fourth Amendment violation
per se, adopting instead a more flexible approach that renders the trespass just one
factor in making the "reasonable expectation of privacy" determination.62 This,
presumably, is true of personal property as well as real property.63
Second, as with common-law trespass, official non-compliance with positive
law more generally is neither necessary nor sufficient for there to be a Fourth
Amendment search. So, for example, in Kyllo, the Court held that there was a
" See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment
and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L.
REv. 373, 377-78 (2006). See generally Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of
Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 113 (2015) (arguing that the subjective prong of the Katz
test is essentially irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment inquiry).
39United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion).
n United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,442 (1976).
3 9Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,29-30 (2001).
3 Id at 34.
aUnited States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 297-298, 301 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
173-74 (1984).
63 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 303-04; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179-81. The Court also held that the Fourth
Amendment did not cover such open fields because they did not constitute "persons, houses, papers, [or]
effects." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176. This aspect of Oliver re-affirmed the Olmstead-era case of Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
6 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 ("The existence of a property right is but one element in determining
whether expectations of privacy are legitimate.").
6 See California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 320 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting claim that
rummaging through defendant's trash was a Fourth Amendment search, even if defendant maintained a
property right in it, on the ground that "the reach of the Fourth Amendment is not determined by state
property law").
Fourth Amendment search despite the apparent absence of any positive law
proscription on the use of thermal imaging devices." Conversely, the Court held in
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States and Calfornia v. Greenwood that violation of
positive law does not necessarily make out a Fourth Amendment search." In Dow
Chem. Co., officials from the federal Environmental Protection Agency flew over a
Dow manufacturing facility and took detailed photographs." State trade-secret and
anti-surveillance laws arguably forbade such conduct.6 1 In Greenwood, police had
rummaged through the defendant's trash which he had placed in opaque plastic
bags on the curb beyond the curtilage of his home for garbage pick-up." The
constitution of California, where Greenwood lived, forbade government officials
from searching through garbage under these circumstances.' In addition, some
municipal ordinances prohibited anyone other than an authorized trash collector
from rummaging through another person's garbage.o Nonetheless, in both cases,
the Court held that there was no Fourth Amendment search, specifically rejecting
the idea that positive law can by itself form the basis for a Fourth Amendment
reasonable expectation of privacy."
Third, at the same time, the Court has referred to positive law, as well as to
general notions of property, tort, and agency, to sketch out the boundaries of the
Fourth Amendment. For example, in Cahfornia v. Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley, the
" See Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). It may well be that the police in Kyllo committed the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion under Oregon law. See Mauri v. Smith, 929 P.2d 307, 310 (Or. 1996)
(describing Oregon's application of the intrusion upon seclusion tort). It is questionable, however,
whether any reasonable jury could find that determining the amount of heat escaping various parts of a
home would be found "highly offensive to a reasonable person." See John F. Preis, Constitutional
Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L REv. 1663, 1740 (2009) (concluding that it is "unclear .. . whether
using thermal imaging to search a house will be an intrusion upon seclusion under state tort law"); c.f
McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 346-347 (Or. 1975) (surveillance was, as a matter of
law, not "highly offensive to a reasonable" person, where it was performed "during daylight hours and
when plaintiff was exposed to public view by his neighbors and passerasby"). The point here is that the
Kyllo Court found that a Fourth Amendment search occurred irrespective of whether a state law tort had
also occurred.
' California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1988) (holding that although seizure of garbage
may be impermissible as a matter of California law, "concepts of privacy under the laws of each State"
do not determine the reach of the Fourth Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
239 & n.6 (1986) (holding that despite a possible violation of trade secret laws, "the taking of aerial
photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment").
6 Dow, 476 U.S. at 229.
7 Id at 248 n.10 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing M.C.LA. §§
752.772, 750.539a-539b).
6 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37-39.
*Id at 43 (citing People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971)).
* California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307,325 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
7n Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43 ("We have never intimated . . . that whether or not a search is
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends on the law of the particular State in
which the search occurs."); Dow 476 U.S. at 232 ("State tort law governing unfair competition does not
define the limits of the Fourth Amendment"); see also Rooney, 483 U.S. at 325 (White, J., dissenting)
(per curiam) (expressing doubt that a municipal ordinance forbidding all but authorized trash collectors
from rummaging through another's refuse could form the basis, by itself, for a reasonable expectation of
privacy).
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Court considered whether flying over a person's property in a fixed-wing aircraft or
a helicopter, respectively, in order to view his curtilage constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search.' The Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in these cases, largely because in each case the aircraft was in legally
navigable airspace and therefore any member of the flying public could have done
what the police did. 3
The Court also emphasized general property law concepts in Rakas v. Illinois.'
The question there was whether the non-owner passengers of a car had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the car so that they could claim the benefit of the
exclusionary rule as a result of an arguably unlawful search of the car." The
question was whether they had "a legally sufficient interest" in the place searched
"so that the Fourth Amendment protect[ed] [them] from unreasonable
governmental intrusion into that place."' The Court was careful to note that such
"a legally sufficient interest" did not have to accord with technical property and tort
law notions-"arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between
guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control""--and a person might
have a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the absence of a cognizable
property interest at common law.7 8
Yet the Court also nodded toward property law interests as being heavily
indicative of whether the Fourth Amendment applied. It wrote that "[1]egitimation
of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society."' Moreover,
although an expectation of privacy sufficient to warrant Fourth Amendment
protection "need not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal
property ... the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in
determining" reasonable expectation of privacy.' As Justice Powell put it in his
concurrence, "property rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's
' Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1989) (plurality); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
209(1986).
3 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451-52 (plurality); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
74439 U.S. 128 (1978).
Id at 140. While the police conduct in Rakas was undoubtedly a search, the question was whether
it was a search as to the defendants who sought to invoke the exclusionary rule. Id Thus, although
someone had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, the question was whether these passengers
did as well. Id at 140-41. As the Court has sometimes put it, the issue is whether the person claiming
the benefit of the exclusionary rule has standing to complain about the allegedly unlawful search. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910 (1984) ("Standing to invoke the [exclusionary] rule has ...
been limited to cases in which the prosecution seeks to use the fruits of an illegal search or seizure
against the victim of police misconduct").
7 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142.
n Id at 143.
' Id (discussing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), in which the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment protected an overnight guest in a home in the absence of the homeowner).
"Id at 143 n.12.
o Id
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authority to act as he wishes in certain areas.""' Thus, while the dissent's charge
that the Court had improperly yoked the Fourth Amendment to property law was.
surely overblown,82 the Court did acknowledge the gravitational pull of property
and tort law on the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, as the language in Rakas indicates, the Court must often look to social
conventions and social norms-"understandings that are recognized and permitted
by society" -in order to determine what expectations of privacy are reasonable,
justifiable, or legitimate." As Justice Harlan, author of the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" formulation, put it in a later case: "Our expectations, and the risks we
assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and
values of the past and present."
This relationship between social norms and expectations of privacy is clear
from cases such as Bond v. United States.' The issue there was whether a federal
agent's physical manipulation of soft luggage in the overhead compartment of a
bus in order to examine its contents constituted a search." The Court held that it
did." Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a seven-Member majority, reasoned that
although bus passengers expect that their bags might be touched or even handled
by others after placing them in an overhead bin, they do not expect that others will
feel their bags "in an exploratory manner."" By contrast, Justice Breyer, writing in
dissent for himself and Justice Scalia, concluded that the "tactile inspection" of the
bag was little different from the treatment that one can expect "from strangers in a
world of travel that is somewhat less gentle than it used to be[.]""
Another important example of the Court's use of social conventions and social
norms in determining the metes and bounds of the Fourth Amendment comes from
the third-party consent cases. Although these cases indisputably involve Fourth
Amendment searches-typically, they involve police entry into homes--they share
a methodology in common with the search cases." The issue in these cases is
whether a third party had authority to bind the defendant with her consent to
search." But authority to render consent capable of binding others is just the flip
side of the "standing" question: generally, one who has a sufficient expectation of
&1 Id at 153 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct 2206, 2227
(2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("'[P]roperty concepts' are ... fundamental 'in determining the
presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by th[e] Amendment'" (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S.
at 143 n.12) (alterations added))).
2 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156-57 (White, J., dissenting) ("Mhe Court ... effectively ties the
application of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule ... to property law concepts.").
a Id at 143 n.12 (majority opinion).
* United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
* 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
8 Id at 335-36.
8 Id at 338-39.
8 Id
" Id at 340 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
' See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 113-14 (2006); United States v. Matiock, 415 U.S. 164,
170, 171 n.7 (1974).
" Sometimes the issue is whether, even though the third party did not have such authority, the
police neasonably believed that she did. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990). These
cases are not relevant to the search issue.
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privacy in the place searched also has sufficient authority over that place as to bind
with her consent others with whom she shares that authority; and one who lacks
such an expectation of privacy also generally lacks the authority to bind others with
her consent.' As Justice O'Connor put it: "Standing to object to [a] search ... and
power to give effective consent to the search, should go hand in hand."'
In the consent cases, the Court has devised a rule that a third party sharing
living quarters with another may generally issue valid consent, binding upon the
co-occupant, to a search of those quarters." This rule applies even if the
co-occupant has previously objected to the search but is no longer present.95 The
rule is subject, it seems, to only one exception: if a co-occupant is present and
objects to the search, the consent of another is not binding, at least as to him.'
In fashioning this rule and its narrow exception, the Court has again been
careful to note that social expectations, not the law of property or tort, are
paramount. In the formative case, United States v. Matlock, the Court wrote that
authority to bind a co-occupant with one's consent "is ... not to be implied from
the mere property interest [one] has in the property," and such "authority ... does
not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal
refinements.' Rather, such authority rests upon "mutual use of the property by
persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes."" In Georgia v.
Randolph, the Court elaborated that divination of when such authority exists must
be accomplished by examining "customary social usage."" The touchstone is
' United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 724 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) ("[S]urely a homeowner cannot simultaneously have so little interest in a container that
his consent to its search is constitutionally ineffective, and have so great an interest in the container that
its search violates his constitutional rights."); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 163 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("If a nonowncr may consent to a search merely because he is a joint user or occupant of a
'premises,' . . . then that same nonowner must have a protected privacy interest. The scope of authority
sufficient to grant a valid consent can hardly be broader than the contours of protected privacy."
(citation omitted)); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 112-13 (observing that expectations of privacy that
shape standing also help determine consent). But see id at 130 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) ("[Tlho Court
has not looked to [social] expectations to decide questions of consent under the Fourth Amendment, but
only to determine when a search has occurred and when a particular person has standing to object to a
search.").
" Karo, 468 U.S. at 724 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MIcH. L. REv. 561, 588-90 (2009) (asserting
that cases establishing third-party doctrine under Katz are really about consent). See generally Craig ?V
Bradley, The Fourth Amendment's Iron Triangle: Consent Standing, and "Searchability," TRIAL,
August 1999, at 75 (discussing connection between consent and standing).
* Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) ("[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over
premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is
shared.").
" Fernandez v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1126, 1135-36 (2014) (rejecting defendant's argument that his
objection to police entry remained effective even after he was arrested and removed from the scene).
9 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[A] warrantless search of a shared
dwelling ... over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident [is not] reasonable as to
him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident").
* Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
9 Id
"Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120-21 ("[Tbe right to admit the police to which Matlock refers is not an
enduring and enforceable ownership right as understood by the private law of property, but is instead the
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constructed from the "widely shared social expectations," and "commonly held
understanding[s]" about the mutual rights and obligations of co-inhabitants'" that
constitute "social custom"' and "social practice." 02 B1ut, acknowledging the
relationship between customary social usage and positive law, the Court observed
that the former could be shaped by "state-law property rights" and "contractual
arrangements," as well as by "other source[s]."'io Indeed, the Court recognized the
mutually constitutive nature of positive law and customary social usage, writing
both that "social expectations . . . are naturally enough influenced by the law of
property," and, conversely, that such "social custom" is itself "reflect[ed] in private
law."'" Thus, customary social usage and positive law exist in a mutually
reinforcing relationship: social expectations inform positive law and positive law,
in turn, shapes social expectations.
C. The "Resurgence" of Trespass
So things stood until 2012, when the Court decided United States v. Jones.0
In that case, federal agents had attached to Jones's wife's car an electronic device
to monitor its movements through a global positioning system ("GPS") for
twenty-eight days, obtaining evidence that was later used to convict him of federal
narcotics charges.'" Although agents had obtained a warrant, they did not comply
with its terms in attaching the device, so the Government argued that the
attachment and subsequent monitoring did not require a warrant at all because this
conduct did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search.07
The Court rejected this argument but did so in a surprising way. Rather than
deem the government conduct a search on the ground that it breached Jones's
reasonable expectation of privacy,os the Court invoked its earlier cases by holding
that the agents' conduct was a search because they "physically occupied private
property for the purpose of obtaining information."" This older "physical
intrusion" test, the Court informed us, was not laid to rest by Katz but had merely
lain dormant: "the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to,
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.""o Thus, the Court
authority recognized by customary social usage.. . ."); see also id at 121 (referring to "customary
social understanding").
100Id at 111.
101 Id at 120.
02 Id at 114.
"n Id at 112; see also id at 114 (looking for "authority in law or social practice").
1o' Id at 111, 120.
10s 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
I
06 Id at 402-03.
'7 Id at 402-03 & n.1.
'0 See id at 430-31 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that there was a search based
on the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test as opposed to a physical trespass test).
10 Id at 404-405 (majority opinion); see also id at 406-07 n.3 (holding that a search occurs
"[w]here ... the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected
area"); id at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("When the government physically invades personal
property to gather information, a scarch occurs.").
"o Id at 409 (majority opinion).
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resurrected-or at least awoke from its long slumber-the physical intrusion test
exemplified by Silverman.'"
The Court subsequently applied this reinvigorated physical intrusion test in
Florida v. Jardines."2 There, two Florida police officers entered onto Jardines's
property with a drug-sniffing dog, and approached the front door of Jardines's
house via the driveway and a paved walkway."I The dog alerted to the presence of
illegal narcotics inside the house, leading to a search warrant and, ultimately, the
filing of state drug charges against Jardines."' Once again, the Court found that a
Fourth Amendment search had occurred based on the "physical intrusion" theory
advanced in Jones. The officers conducted a search when "they gathered . . .
information by physically entering and occupying the [curtilage of Jardines's
home] to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the
homeowner.""5 Because there was undoubtedly a physical entry upon Jardines's
land without his express consent, the only question was whether his consent could
be implied." 6 The Court conceded that "background social norms" permit people
to approach a front door, knock, and ask to speak to the occupant."7 Moreover, a
police officer can do the same "because that is 'no more than any private citizen
might do.""'" But those same "background social norms" do not invite a visitor or,
therefore, a police officer, to approach the front door, fail to knock, and instead
look for information about the premises." "There is no customary invitation to do
that." 20
In neither Jones nor Jardines did the Court hold, or even suggest, that the
technical law of trespass determined whether an unlicensed physical intrusion had
occurred. Indeed, its caginess was noteworthy. In response to Justice Alto's
charge in his separate opinion in Jones that the Court was applying "18"'-century
tort law,"'21 the Court responded opaquely that, instead, it was applying "an
18'-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, which ... must provide at a
"365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
112 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
'id at 3-4; id at 17 (Alito, J., dissenting).
"' Id at 4 (majority opinion).
I's d at 6.
" 6 See id at 7 ("Since the officers' investigation took place in a constitutionally protected area, we
turn to the question of whether it was accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion.").
" Id at 9.
"'Id at 8 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)).
" Id at 9 ("[T]hc background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him
there to conduct a search.").
1 Id The Court applied Jones in one subsequent case, Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368,
1369 (2015) (per curiam), in which a registered sex offender objected on Fourth Amendment grounds to
statutorily-mandated, continual, perpetual surveillance via a tracking device attached to his body. The
North Carolina state courts rejected the claim that the Fourth Amendment applied. Id at 1369-70.
Reversing per curiam, the U.S. Supreme Court held this to be an a fortiori case from Jones: if attaching
a tracking device to Jones's car had been a trespass to chattel, then surely attaching a tracking device to
Grady's body was a trespass to his person. See id at 1370 ("[I]t follows [from Jones and Jardines] that a
State ... conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person's body, without consent, for the
purpose of tracking that individual's movements.").
121 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,418 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted."" And in
response to Justice Alito's complaint that the Court's reliance on a "physical
intrusion" test could lead to different results in different States,' the Court's
response was utter silence. Jardines was equally ambivalent as to what law it
looked to in order to determine whether consent to entry could be implied. Indeed,
one commentator, observing that the Court scrupulously avoided all use of the term
"trespass," concluded that it did so because the Florida courts had already
determined that there was no trespass under state law.124 Presumably, the Court, as
in the pre-Katz cases, did not want to tie the Fourth Amendment to "local" tort and
property law.
II. A POST-JONES SYNTHESIS: SOCIAL NORMS GOVERNING SECURITY AGAINST
PRIVATE INTRUSIONS AS THE TOUCHSTONE
As Professor Orin Kerr has shown, the distinction between the pre-Katz and
post-Katz eras has been overstated by both scholars and the courts.'25 The
conventional thinking is that pre-Katz Fourth Amendment law orbited around the
positive law of trespass, while post-Katz law represented a sharp break with such
property law concepts in informing the Fourth Amendment search inquiry.
But pre-Katz cases did not rely solely upon positive property and tort law
concepts-indeed, they often openly eschewed them-in formulating the metes and
bounds of Fourth Amendment searches. And post-Katz cases did not completely
jettison reliance on these concepts. The most that can be said is that pre-Katz cases
focused upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion, but generally
declined to use positive property and tort law concepts to define what a physical
intrusion was in close cases. And post-Katz cases use an amalgam of rationales,
including but not limited to positive law, to discern reasonable expectations of
privacy based on customary social usage. Katz was more evolutionary than
revolutionary.
More fundamentally, however, what have been characterized as distinct
touchstones, trespass and reasonable expectations of privacy, are not as distinct as
they appear at first blush. It is more accurate to describe them as representing two
separate stages in the development of the same root idea: established societal
norms governing security against intrusions upon persons and property. Reasonable
expectations of privacy depend largely, as the Randolph Court put it, on
"customary social usage"'-social norms, understandings, and expectations
governing how individuals conduct themselves vis-4-vis their fellow individuals'
claims to security from intrusions. But the common law of trespass, as the framers
'" Id at 411 (majority opinion).
k2 Id at 425 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[U]ndor the Court's theory, the coverage of
the Fourth Amendment may vary from State to State.").
11 Bradley Pollina, Florida v. Jardines: Why the Supreme Court Did Not Say Trespass, WAKE
FoRIEr L REv. ONLINE (May 7, 2013), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2013/05/florida-v-jardines-
why-the-supreme-court-did-not-say-trespass/ [https://permac/A86H-DAJB].
1̀  See Kerr, supra note 6, at 81-90.
"nGeorgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).
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and ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment understood it, developed from that selfsame
"customary social usage." Expectations of privacy, on the one hand, and trespass,
on the other, while they may be two distinct species, derive from the same family
of concepts. They represent different points on an evolutionary spectrum. What
begins as social practice evolves into social understanding and expectation, which
sometimes morphs into enforceable rights and interests, which often hardens into
positive law. What we know as "expectations of privacy" merely constitute the
precursor to a matrix of enforceable legal rights. What we know as trespass is
simply the fully formed product of that evolutionary process. That evolutionary
process continues to this day.
A. An Originalist Approach to the Fourth Amendment Search Question
Divining an understanding of what the framers and ratifiers of the Fourth
Amendment saw as its scope is no easy task. At the time the Amendment was
adopted, after all, investigative technology was barely in embryonic form. Thus, a
search almost necessarily involved a physical intrusion into an area, a thing, or a
person.127 Perhaps, then, the Fourth Amendment's scope was understood in 1791
as being limited to physical intrusions of "persons, houses, papers, [or] effects." 28
Pre-Katz case law suggests as much.'"
It is not surprising, then, that an originalist such as Justice Scalia was a fierce
critic of Katz and at one time advocated a return to the trespass-centered, pre-Katz
case law. The flaws of the Katz test, in his view, were essentially threefold. First,
the test was divorced from the text and history of the Fourth Amendment.'30
Second, he viewed the test as circular, in that it extends constitutional protection to
those expectations of privacy, and only those expectations of privacy, that we
generally believe are protected."' Finally, and perhaps worst of all, he viewed the
test as anti-democratic because it allows unelected federal judges to import their
policy preferences into law by declaring their own expectations of privacy to be
those that are reasonable.13 2As he put it, the Fourth Amendment:
" See Kerr, supra note 6, at 72-75.
2 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
* See sqpra Section I.A.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[TJhat self-indulgent
test ... has no plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment."); see also Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Katz test has no basis in the
text or history of the Fourth Amendment.").
1' Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (Scalia, J.) ("The Katz test ... has often been
criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable."); see also Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2245
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that viewing the Katz as descriptive "risks 'circular[ity]'" (quoting
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (alteration in original))).
12 Carter, 525 U.S. at 97-98 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[TJhc only thing the past three decades have
established about the Katz test ... is that, unsurprisingly, those 'actual (subjective) expectation[s] of
privacy' 'that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable"' . . . bear an uncanny resemblance to
those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable." (citations omitted and alterations in
original)); see also Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2246 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Tjhis Court's precedents ...
bear the hallmarks of subjective policymaking instead of neutral legal decisionmaking."); id at 2256
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[D]id not guarantee some generalized "right of privacy" and leave it to
this Court to determine which particular manifestations of the value of
privacy "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'". . . .Rather, .
. . it le[ft] further expansion to the good judgment, not of this Court, but
of the people through their representatives in the legislature.13 3
A trespass-based approach, by contrast, supposedly has none of these flaws.
First, it is consistent with the text and history of the Fourth Amendment, given that
the Amendment speaks of "persons, houses, papers, and effects,"" and given that
the types of intrusions that gave rise to the Amendment were uniformly
common-law trespasses to these interests. Second, a trespass-based approach is
ostensibly not circular because it is determined exogenously. Whether government
conduct is a search is contingent on whether such conduct by private persons would
be considered a tortious interference with persons, chattels, or land. By tying the
search question to some branch of positive law outside the Constitution itself a
trespass-based approach avoids circularity. Finally, such an approach ostensibly
limits judicial discretion. By tying the meaning of the Fourth Amendment's terms
to physical trespasses to tangible items, the argument goes, judges cannot smuggle
into constitutional law their own subjective views of the proper balance between
liberty and security. Moreover, the common law of trespass, having evolved over
the centuries, has gained wide acceptance and legitimacy as law. Trespasses to
persons, chattels, and land are clear, leaving little or no room for judges to insert
their own policy preferences over those of the people who have formed and come
to accept the law of trespass.
These arguments have some appeal to an originalist. The Fourth Amendment
was understood in 1791, at least in part, as preserving common-law rights against
federal government officials engaged in searching and seizing.' One very useful
weapon for keeping government officers in check was the common-law suit.
Professor Jerry Mashaw explained: "Customs officers seized property, held goods
in shoreside warehouses, refused to return or release bonds, and held ships in port.
A host of standard common law actions--trespass, trover, debt, detinue, assumpsit,
or the like-were available to test the legality of these official actions."'36
This remained true even after the Constitution was adopted. As Mashaw wrote:
"Congress seems to have presumed that [federal] officers could and would be sued
in state courts in common law actions . . ."i37
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (asserting that legislators are better able than judges to discern what
expectations of privacy are reasonable, whether that test is normative or merely empirical).
* See Carter, 525 U.S. at 97-98 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
' U.S. CONsT. amend IV.
3s See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012).
3 JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONsITUrION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 76 (2012); see also William Baude & James Y. Stem, The
Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARv. L. REv. 1821, 1840 (2016) ("At the time it
was ratified, the only way to enforce rights against unlawful searches and seizures was through private
law rcmodies, such as .. . trespass and falsc imprisonment actions. . .
'37 MASHAW, supra note 136, at 66.
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Prior to adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the Anti-Federalists- those who
opposed the Constitution and were wary of the new, powerful central
government-were not convinced that this would remain the case."' The
Federalists made assurances that state-law protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures would remain in force.139 Roger Sherman said as much at the
tail end of the Constitutional Convention, as did Edmund Randolph in the Virginia
ratifying convention.40 But the Anti-Federalists wanted amendments, not
assurances. Thus was born the Fourth Amendment, which was understood as
expressly preserving the ability of "the people" to bring common-law suits against
federal officials who too zealously interfere with their "secur[ity]" in their
"persons, houses, papers, and effects."''
But while it is true that in 1791 the common-law tort action that the Fourth
Amendment preserved had as its touchstone some physical trespass to land, chattel,
or person, the common law has evolved to encompass modem torts that do not
involve physical trespass. Even Justice Scalia ultimately came to recognize this.
Writing for the Court in Kyllo v. United States, he acknowledged that, in order to
"assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted," the Court must sometimes go beyond
the notion of physical trespass.4 2 Accordingly, the Court held that use of a thermal
imaging device to obtain details from within a home was a Fourth Amendment
search, despite the absence of any trespass.'3 As the Kyllo Court recognized
implicitly, to say that the Fourth Amendment protects only against physical
intrusions confounds the specific type of action the framers and ratifiers had in
mind in 1791 with their more general understanding of what the Amendment
accomplished. The Fourth Amendment preserves common-law protections against
federal officials who undertake unreasonable searches and seizures of the people's
persons, houses, papers, and effects. But the Fourth Amendment evolves as the
common law upon which it is premised evolves. As Justice Scalia wrote: "There is
nothing new or surprising in the proposition that our unchanging Constitution
refers to other bodies of law that might themselves change."44
'" See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Contingent Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY LJ. 1229,
1263-68 (2015).
'3 See id at 1285.
"Id at 1267.
"' See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 771-78
(1994) (discussing framers' and ratifiers' concern that too-loose standards for issuance of warrants
would immunize federal officers from common-law tort actions); Baude & Stern, supra note 136, at
1841 (observing that the Fourth Amendment preserved the States' ability "to define positive law
entitlements broadly in order to guard against abuses of their citizens by federal agents"); Michael J.
Zydney Mannheimer, The Local-Control Model of the Fourth Amendment, 108 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 253,267-70 (2018) (arguing that common-law tort actions were one mechanism among
others preserved by the Fourth Amendment of maintaining local control of search and seizure policy).
'o Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
'' See id at 40 ("Where ... the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a 'search'. . . .").
'" Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 144 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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While a Fourth Amendment that dynamically incorporates the underlying
common law "presents no problem for the originalist,"'l45 an originalist account of
Fourth Amendment search doctrine must still use the framers' and ratifiers' view of
the common law in 1791 as the jumping off point. For even if they understood the
Fourth Amendment as dynamically incorporating the common law, a deeper
exploration into how they viewed the nature of the common law is required. And in
1791, the common law was conceived of as consisting of, and having sprnmg from,
custom.
B. The Common Law as Customary Social Usage
Given the contemporaneous understanding of the Fourth Amendment as a
preservation of common law rights as against federal government officials, it is
critical to examine precisely what the framers and ratifiers of the Fourth
Amendment understood as the common law. For centuries before the framing
period, English jurists understood the common law as encompassing-indeed,
consisting of-custom. Custom was "grown law,"'" arising organically from the
people, who gave it their tacit consent by following and applying it, until it became
standardized and uniform, and assumed the mantle of law. Critically, custom was
seen as law even before it was ever adopted by statute or judicial decree.
i. The Traditional View of English Common Law as Custom
"[B]efore any clearly articulated system of law-making and
law-dispensing has developed, the conduct of men in society is governed by
customary rules."'' This had been recognized as far back as Justinian."s As John
Davies put it in the early seventeenth century: "[Tlhe [c]ommon [1]aw[] of England
is nothing else but the [c]ommon custom[] of the [r]ealm[] . .. ."149 Glanvill and
Bracton recognized this in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, respectively,'
as seen in the titles of their respective treatises: The Laws and Customs of
' Id
'" See I FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 88,95,105 (1973).
14 CARLTON K ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 28 (2d ed. 1930).
'" See R.H. Helmholz, Christopher St. German and the law of Custom, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 129,
131 (2003) ("Custom of long standing is rightly regarded as law." (quoting I THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN,
13 (Theodor Mommsen, Paul Krueger, & Alan Watson eds., 1985) (translation of Digestum Justiniani
1.3.32))).
us9 JOHN DAVIEs, 2 SIR JOHN DAVIEs' COMPLETE WORKS, VERSE AND PROSE 251-52 (A. B.
Grosart ed., 1869); accord Darrell A.H. Miller, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Regulation of
Custom, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1811, 1816 (2012); see also Helmholz, supra note 148, at 138-39 ("In
England .... [tihe common law was custom. It was all that existed.").
'" See E.K. Braybrooke, Custom as a Source of English Law, 50 MIcH. L REv. 71, 72 (1951)
(discussing Bracton); Helmbolz, supra note 148, at 134 (discussing both); Albert Kiralfy, Custom in
Mediaeval English Law, 9 J. LEG. HIsT. 26, 27 (1988) (discussing Bracton); Gerard J. Postema,
Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part 1), 2 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH LJ. 155, 168 (2002)
(discussing both).
Vol. 107190
2018-2019 DECENTRALIZING FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH DOCTRINE 191
England and Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England."'
Sixteenth-century jurist Christopher St. Germain treated "custom as a source of
law" as a constantly recurring theme in his text Doctor and Student.5 2
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, English jurists built upon this view
of English common law as having custom at its foundation. Sir Edward Coke
reaffirmed and expanded upon this view of the common law through a historical
lens as the accumulation of hundreds of years of custom and usage.53 This view of
the past was used "symbolically" and "metaphorically," for no one really knew
how the common law developed." Still, the idea of "immemorial usage" as the
foundation of custom was central to Coke's view of the law.'" Where Coke
emphasized immemorial usage from a remote past, his pupil John Selden added
greatly to this historical view of the law by emphasizing the law's evolutionary
nature.'" Where Coke had stressed continuity, Selden emphasized change.'"
Selden's own pupil, Matthew Hale, continued and built upon this conception of the
law "as a manifestation of the historically developing ethos, the historical ideals
and traditions, the evolving customs, of a people or society whose law it is."'"
Hale wrote that the common law of England comprised "three 'formal
constituents': "usage and custom, Acts of Parliament, and decisions of the courts
"' HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (1250); RANULF DE
GLANVILL, THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE KINGDOM OF ENGLAND (1189).
'" See Helmholz, supra note 148, at 134 ("What St German described as 'general customs of old
time used throughout all the realm, which have been accepted and approved by [the English Kings] and
all their subjects' were for him an immediate source of English law.") (quoting ST. GERMAN'S DOCTOR
AND STUDENT 45 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton, eds., 1974)).
s See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jrisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE
U. 1651, 1686 (1994) (observing that Coke espoused "the theory that the common law [w]as a body of
principles, concepts, rules, and procedures that originated in a remote past"); id at 1681 (noting that
Coke's "historical jurisprudence" was at odds with "both legal positivism and natural law theory").
'" Id at 1687; see also Gerard J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3
OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 21 (2003) ("[TJhe history to which Coke and others like him
appealed bordered on the mythological."). For this reason, the (distinctly minority) dissenting view
developed by Professor Braybrooke is almost beside the point He disputed as a historical matter the
extent to which law developed from the practices of the people and posited that policy decisions made
by judges accounted for the development of the common law far more than custom. See generally
Braybrooke, supra note 150. But an originalist account of the Fourth Amendment is concerned with
how the framers and ratifiers viewed the relationship between custom and law, not whether their view
was historically accurate.
'" Postema, supra note 150, at 169 (observing that Coke, as well as Davies, "put the notion of
immemorial usage at the centre of their conception of common law" (emphasis omitted)); see also
Berman, supra note 153, at 1687-89 ("[H]istory for [Coke] was not a science but a faith.").
'5 Berman, supra note 153, at 1695 ("[Selden] carried Coke's historicism one giant step beyond the
conception of an immemorial past and an unchangable fundamental law to the conception of an
evolutionary past and an evolving fundamental law.").
In See id at 1695-96 ("Selden ... reaffirmed the continuity but also emphasized the changes. He
stressed development, growth."); Postema, supra note 150, at 173 ("Selden showed through painstaking
historical research that English law had gone through vast changes . . . .").
' Berman, supra note 153, at 1708; see also Postema, supra note 154, at 22 ("[Hale] . . .
maintained that the 'strength and obligation and the formal nature of a law' does not rest in any way on
its antiquity.").
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of justice." 59 As for the first category, he wrote that "some of th[e] [flaws have
obtain[e]d their [florce by immemorial [u]sage or [c]ustom."'"
Even by the time of the framing period, the common law was seen as
indistinguishable from custom. Coke, Selden, and Hale's views of English common
law, as the end product of centuries of custom and usage, was espoused during the
framing period by William Blackstone.'' Blackstone, whose influence on the
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights is well documented,16 2
essentially equated the common law with custom. He famously declared that the
common law could be divided into three parts. First, "[g]eneral customs . . . are the
universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the common law, in its stricter and
more usual signification."'6  Second, there are "[p]articular customs[] which, for
the most part, affect only the inhabitants of particular districts."' Finally, there are
"[c]ertain particular laws . . . used by some particular courts."' Thus, Blackstone
equated "general customs" with "the common law, properly so called."'" Modem
scholars continue to equate custom and common law, as Plucknett did when he
wrote that prior to the modem age of legislation "the principal element in most
legal systems was custom.""'6 According to Blackstone, the "general immemorial
custom" was the "chief corner stone of the laws of England."'"
ii. The Democratic Foundations of Custom as Law
As Blackstone wrote, custom becomes transformed into law by a process of
long social usage that culminates in its universal acceptance in the polity. He wrote
that customs that become law properly so-called "receive their binding power, and
the force of laws, by long and immemorial usage, and by their universal reception
throughout the kingdom."'6 9 A key requirement for custom to be considered law
was its long usage. As Blackstone wrote, "the goodness of a custom depends upon
its having been used time out of mind; or, in the solemnity of our legal phrase, time
'" Postema, supra note 154, at 11.
'0 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 2 (3d ed. 1739).
161 See Berman, supra note 153, at 1733.
'6 Id at 1734 n.227 ("Blackstone's influence in America was perhaps even greater than in England.
Edmund Burke stated in 1775 that as many copies of the Commentaries had been sold in the American
colonics as in England.").
163 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67.
'" Id
165 Id
'" Id at *68; see also Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L REV. 711, 742 (1986) ("It was a commonplace among British
jurisprudes that a general custom, the 'custom of the country,' is none other than the common law
itself").
16 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNBTr, A CONsSE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 307 (5th ed. 1956);
see also FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE FOR STUDENffS OF THE COMMoN LAW
284 (5th ed. 1923) ("Another use of the term 'custom' is to denote rules that once fbrmed an exceptional
body of law, but have been adopted within historical times as part of the Common Law.").
' I BLACKSTONE, supra note 163, at *73.
1
6
9 Id. at *64.
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whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary."7 0 Its immemoriality,
according to Blackstone, gives custom the force of law."'
One purpose served by the long usage requirement was to ensure that the
resulting common law was good, true, and pure. For if a maxim or rule could
survive for a lengthy period, one could be reasonably assured that it met the
requirements for reason. On this view, most often associated with Coke, English
law "by many successions of ages ... ha[s] been[] fined and refined by an infinite
number of grave and learned men, and by long experience grown[] to such a
perfection. .. ."172 "[L]aw," in Coke's memorable aphorism, "is the perfection of
reason."17
The more practical, and less mystical, reason for a long usage benchmark had to
do with consent. If a rule or maxim could survive to be handed down from
generation to generation, that was a sign that it had gained the general assent of the
community. This justified its nature as binding law." In this way, the process of
custom attaining the force of law was profoundly democratic. While obviously no
votes were taken by the people or their representatives, as with statutory law, the
durability and longevity of a custom stood in as a surrogate for these more formal
mechanisms.'7 5 Indeed, one could argue that the formation of law out of custom
was hyper-democratic. Given the inertia one must overcome to alter or repeal a
statute, it might be able to claim only the support of a political moment in time.
Custom, by contrast, maintains support across the decades, even generations.'
At the same time, custom was recognized as constantly evolving. Indeed, it
appears that the requirement that custom be of "immemorial" vintage was not
applied prior to the sixteenth century.17 7 To the contrary, custom could be
'"Id at *67.
"' Id ("This it is that gives it its weight and authority....").
17 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INsrrrUrEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 97b
(Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., 15th ed., 1794); see also Berman, supra note 153, at 1692
("[The artificial reason of the English common law was the unique reason, logic, sense, and purposes of
the historically rooted law of the English nation, a repository of the thinking and experience of the
English common lawyers over many centuries."); Postema, supra note 150, at 170 ("Time provides the
opportunity for continuous testing, adjusting and refining of the law through deliberation and
argument.").
" 1 COKE, supra note 172, § 97b.
' See Berman, supra note 153, at 1699 (observing that Solden viewed "the binding force of
customary law ... as essentially consensual in nature"); Postema, supra note 154, at 24 ("Consent is
evidenced in, indeed constituted by, long usage . . . ."); Andrea C. Loux, Note, The Persistence of the
Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility, and the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
183, 202 (1993) (observing that the "legitimacy" of custom as a form of law "rested on the consent of
the people").
1" See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 163, at *73 ("[TJhe written law binds us for no other reason but
because it is approved by a judgment of the people, therefore those laws which the people have
approved without writing ought also to bind every body."); PLUCKNETT, supra note 167, at 308
(observing that custom "proceeded from the people, expressed their legal thought, and regulated their
civil, commercial and family life").
'76 See Berman, supra note 153, at 1699-1700 ("[C]onsent, in Selden's view, was manifested in
custom, that is, in the patterns and norms of behavior tacitly or expressly accepted by the community ...
over many generations and centuries.").
'" PLucKNETT, supra note 167, at 312.
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recognized as a constituent of common law even if not immemorially old."'
Quoting the twelfth-to-thirteenth-century Italian jurist, Azo of Bologna, Plucknett
asserted: "A custom can be called long ... if it was introduced within ten or twenty
years, very long if it dates from thirty years, and ancient if it dates from forty
years.""' Thus, the custom of the Middle Ages was not unlike the common law of
today in that it attempted to balance stability with adaptability to conditions that
might change over the course of a few decades."s
This recognition that the common law evolved with custom was also
democratic in origin and consent-based. That people be ruled by their own hands
and not the dead hand of the past, the law must change as custom does to fit the
changing needs of the polity. Rules "are refined over time, softened to fit the
contours of the community's daily life."'' In a continuing feedback loop, the rules
themselves "shape[] the dispositions, beliefs and expectations of the people."'" In
the balance between continuity and change lay the evolution of custom posing
"solutions to the problems of social interaction."'" Thus, Selden and, particularly,
Hale, who emphasized the evolutionary nature of the common law rather than
its immemoriality, also rooted the moral force of the law in consent'"
By accommodating the consent implicit in generations of usage with the
current needs of the polity, custom represents the highest value of English
liberty- self-government.'is
iii. The Transformation from Practice to Law
Today's major four-lane thoroughfare might have begun thousands of
years ago as a path trod through the woods by mammoths or buffalo in search of
water and food. Pre-modern hunters of the large game cut he path ever more
clearly and deeply with their footsteps and primitive tools. The path became an
artery between native settlements or trading posts. When Europeans took the land,
they adopted the path, clearing and smoothing it further for travel by horse and
carriage. Finally, the path was paved for use by automobiles and widened to
accommodate more traffic.
'" Id at 307 (dismissing as "historically inaccurate" the notion that "custom is or ought to be
immemorially old").
'" Id at 308 (emphasis omitted).
'n See id (noting that in the Middle Ages, customs "dcvelop[cd] and adapt[ed] themselves to
constantly changing conditions").
' Postema, supra note 150, at 175.
'n Id; see also Postema, supra note 154, at 24 ("The laws are approved or accepted by the whole
people in virtue of and manifested in that law's integration ... into their daily lives .....
* Postema, supra note 150, at 175.
' 4Postema, supra note 154, at 22.
8 See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 163, at *74 ("[I]t is one of the characteristic marks of English
liberty, that our common law depends upon custom; which carries this internal evidence of freedom
along with it, that it probably was introduced by the voluntary consent of the peopie."); Berman, supra
note 153, at 1699 ("[Tlhe ultimate source of the legitimacy of human laws lies ... not only in their
correspondence to the will of the legitimate lawmaking authority, but also in their conformity to the
consent of the people.").
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The transformative process by which custom becomes law is similar.' It was
summed up in this way by a late seventeenth-century treatise on customary law:
When a reasonable Act once done is found to be good, and beneficial to
the People, and agreeable to their nature and disposition, then do they
use it and practise it again and again, and so by often iteration and
multiplication of the Act, it becomes a Custom; and being continued
without interruption time out of mind, it obtaineth the force of a Law.'
Thus, the complex process began with individual practice, as persons living
together in a society learn to balance their individual needs with those of the
community. As some of these practices become repeated by others, social norms
are slowly developed. These social norms, if further adopted and retained, become
custom. And, as we have seen, customs that are agreeable across different
generations become law. But these customs and norms can attain the force of law
well before they are ever expressed in positive law as a statute or the outcome of a
litigated case.
In the beginning, there was practice." Custom (and thus law) began not as
abstract ideas, but as concrete actions.'" "The development of law . . . lies in
human action."" When humans repeatedly face the same or similar environmental
stimuli, we start to offer the same response over and over again, as a way to save
our time and energy for those more distinctive situations that sometimes arise.i9'
Custom thus evolves from practice, and custom is the "interfaice" between practice
and law.'9
Practice led to imitation by others.'" The hydraulic pressure of conformity led
to widespread adoption of a norm, at least "where no great principle [was]
to See Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JuRus. 1, 4 (1969) (comparing.
formation of law from habit and custom to "the mode in which a path is formed across a common").
'8 E. P. THOMPSON, CUrTOMs IN COMMON 97 (1991) (quoting SAMUBL CARTER, LEx
CusTuMARIA (1696)).
' See ALLEN, supra note 147, at 29 ("[C]ustom ... grows up by conduct . . . ."); Miller, supra note
149, at 1815 ("[C]ustom ... originates in praxis.. ...
189 See ALLEN, supra note 147, at 103 ("[R]ulcs and observances present themselves in concrete
forms rather than as abstractions intellectually grasped and applied. Law is here a fact rather than an
idea."); Loux, supra note 174, at 210 ("Custom arose from ancient community praxis . . . .").
' ALLEN, supra note 147, at 54; see also Davies, supra note 149, at 252 ("[CJustom[]
consist[s] in use and practise....").
'
91 See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the
Law of Tort, 21 J. LEOAL STUD. 1, 6 (1992).
19 THOMPSON, supra note 187, at 97 (arguing that custom is "the interftce between law and
agrarian practice ... since it may be considered both as praxis and as law"); see also Postema, supra
note 154, at 6 ("Law is practice, not a theoretical representation of it.").
'9 See ALLEN, supra note 147, at 56 ("In the earliest stages of society, practice plays the greater
part and custom grows by the force of concrete example . . . ."); I HAYEK, supra note 146, at 77
("[Aibstract rules are leamt by imitating particular actions, from which the individual acquires 'by
analogy' the capacity to act in other cases on the same principles . . . ."); Braybrooke, supra note 150, at
73 ("[C]ustom is made 'by the frequent iteration and multiplication of th[e] act'" (quoting Davis Rep.
(Ir.) 28, 32-33, 80 Eng. Rep. 516 (1608)); Epstein, supra note 191, at 12 ("Customs arise. . . from
widespread imitation and adaption of past practice.").
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involved."'" The impulse to conform one's actions to the prevailing norms
powerfiully achieved something close to consensus.'" This consensus led to
expectations that the norms would be adhered to-"interactional expectancies," in
Lon Fuller's evocative term'96-along with pressures to abide by it and informal
sanctions for non-compliance.'" In this way, practice became normative and not
merely regular or habitual.'9 This is "the compulsive force of custom."'"
This process of practice and imitation was largely automatic. To a great extent,
adoption of certain practices over others was not consciously driven.20 This makes
sense given that these customs and norms were shaped at the societal level, not the
personal level, and coordination problems would have hindered any conscious
formation and spread of norms.201 "In its earliest manifestations, therefore, custom
grows by the force of practical example far more than by the impulse of reasoned
conviction."202
On the other hand, conscious choice did play a part in the formation and spread
of some customs and social norms.203 Sometimes, a custom would "consist of a
selection between two indifferent altematives."204 Once such a selection was made,
however, it would be "followed and tend[ed] to become obligatory by
repetition."2 05 Additionally, imitation took place not just at the micro level, among
denizens of the same area, but at the macro level, among different areas, as well.
For instance, "[wihen a prosperous village or a newly-founded town wished to
secure the franchises of a free borough, or when a borough sought an extension of
its liberties, it was natural for the community to look for a model among its more
"'ALLEN, supra note 147, at 60; see also Id at 60-61 ("To be singular in the ordinary matters of
use and wont is worth neither the effort nor the discomfort").
't Id at 104 ("[A] force of imitation, quite outside logical and utilitarian factors, exerts a powerful
influence over men's minds . . . ").
'Fuller, supra note 186, at 9.
'THOMPSON, supra note 187, at 102 ("Agrarian custom was ... a lived environment comprised of
practices, inherited expectations, rules which both determined limits to usages and disclosed
possibilities, norms and sanctions both of law and neighbourhood pressures."); see also ALLEN, supra
note 147, at 57 (noting that sometimes "practice generat[es] conviction").
'9 Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Custom, 48 TEX. INrL L. 523, 532 (2013) ("[A]ctual
human practices make customs normative."); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CAL. L. REv.
(forthcming Apr. 2019) (manuscript at 24), https//papssrcm l3/papes.cin?abstractk -l3064443
[https-//perma.cc/DY8J-JUN5] ("[C]ustomary law has long been said to demand two things: that there
be widespread practice, and that the practice be followed from a sense of obligation. . .
'9 ALLEN, supra note 147, at 104.
m Id at 103 ("In an embryonic state of social life it is not always possible to suppose that the
concrete practice of certain customs is inspired by any conscious abstract fooling or motive."); see also
Fuller, supra note 186, at 9 ("[TJhe anticipations which most unequivocally shape our behavior and
attitudes toward others are often precisely those that are operative without our being aware of their
presence."); Sachs, supra note 198 (manuscript at 25) ("[TIhe most powerful rules are the ones we obey
without even thinking....").
0 See ALLEN, supra note 147, at 103 ("The conduct embodied in custom is the corporate action of
an aggregation of individuals." (emphasis omitted)).
22 Id
' See id at 57 ("[C]ircumstances often arise in which it is necessary to choose between several
equally desirable or undesirable alternatives.").
2 Id at 104.
2S Id
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privileged and flourishing neighbours."'" In this way, custom spread throughout
England.207
Critically, custom was treated as enforceable law. True, pressure to conform to
custom originally came by way of morals and the imitative pressure noted above,
"not from enforcement by a sovereign state."208 Yet, eventually, customary rules
were cloaked with the mantle of law.20 For example, rules regarding land-holding
grew from custom.21 0 Rules on security, alienability, and heritability of land all
developed as customary rule.21 ' By 1135, there was significant enough
"development and standardization of custom" in this field that it could properly be
called law.2 12 These customary rules were fully enforceable in the local courts,
further fortifying and perpetuating these customs.213
However, affirmation of custom as law in the courts was the exception, not the
rule. That is to say, custom generally existed as a form of law even without the
imprimatur of a judicial ruling or jury verdict. This is because, then as now,
disputes were common, but "only occasionally did [they] arise to the high visibility
of legal action."2 14 Because custom arises primarily from "convention rather than
conflict,"2 15 custom grows primarily from the people, and only secondarily from
the pronouncements of a lawgiver.2 16 And, as now, even where cases were brought,
they often were disposed of without any legal ruling on the merits.217 Legal rights
and interests, therefore, exist "even prior to . . . formal recognition by the
2 Id at 66 (quoting I CHARLES GRoss, THE GILD MERCHANT 242 (1890)); see also PLUCKNETr,
supra note 167, at 308 ("[1t is a common sight to sco a group of townspeople examine the customs of
more advanced communities, choose the one they like best, and adopt it en bloc as their own."); Kiralfy,
supra note 150, at 33 (observing that boroughs sometimes adopted new customs by imitating other
polities).
" ALLEN, supra note 147, at 66 ("[C]ustoms originally peculiar to one locality-often customs
deeply affecting the citizen's rights of person and property-become widespread throughout the land."
(citation omitted)).
m JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND SOCIETY IN
ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CAIrrA 20 (1996); see also THOMPSON, supra
note 187, at 100 (asserting that custom begins as "unwritten beliefs, sociological norms, and usages
asserted in practice but never enrolled in any by-law").
2 See THOMPSON, supra note 187, at 98 ("[C]ustom was sharply defined [and] anforecable at
law."); see also ALLEN, s4pra note 147, at 28 ("[Customs] arc 'legal' in this sense, that they arc binding
and obligatory, and the breach of them is a breach of duty."); Hohnholz, supra note 148, at 132
("Custom was not simply a 'background norm.' For many purposes it was treated as binding law.").210 HUDSON, supra note 208, at 20.211 Id at 94-105.
212 ld at 21.
213 Id at 105.
214 THOMPSON, supra note 187, at 104.
215 ALLEN, supra note 147, at 30.
216Id at 29 ("[Customs ... are essentially non-litigious in origin. They arise not from any conflict
of rights adjusted by a supreme arbiter ... but from practices prompted by the convenience of society
and of the individual . . . ."); see also Posterna, supra note 150, at 167 ("[L]aw lived in and evolved
from the practical interactions of daily life as they surfaced in the common law courts.").
217 See Kiralfy, supra note 150, at 27 ("[M]ost cases, like cases today, werc settled out of court, or
dropped, or decided on technicalities of proof or procedure, so that there are few 'leading cases' to
operate as a logical basis for the system.").
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courts."" Indeed, intercession by a judge was simply seen as an affirmation of
customary norms that had already formed, for "it is precisely because judges were
intimately familiar with the complex 'texture [of] human affairs' . . . that they were
best equipped to bring . . . disagreements to a reasonable resolution."219 Thus,
notwithstanding the claims of Austin2 20 and Bentham," the generally accepted
notion of custom in English law is that it "was constantly followed and obeyed
before ever judicial authority had pronounced upon it." 222
Finally, the mass of custom throughout the realm was amalgamated and made
more or less uniform. Although this did not occur in one fell swoop, and historians
disagree on precise dates, all agree that this occurred by the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries.2" Specifically, the ascension to the throne of Henry 11 in 1154 is
typically viewed as the beginning of this amalgamation process.224 Prior to that
time, "most criminal and civil matters were within local or feudal, and not royal,
jurisdiction."225 Henry H created a "central royal bench of judges," which
eventually evolved into the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of King's
Bench."' By establishing jurisdiction in these central authorities, Henry 11 unified
218 Schauer, supra note 198, at 524.219 POstema, supra note 154, at 3 (quoting Matthew Hale, Reflections by the Lord ChiefJustice Hale
on Mr. Hobbes His Dicogue of the Law, in 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
503 (7th ed. 1956)).
m See Schauer supra note 198, at 526 (observing that Austin argued that "[cluston is not law by
itself... but becomes law only upon it being duly adopted by judges . . . ." (citing JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DErERMINED 34-36, 141-42, 238-39 (Wilfrid E. Rumble, Cambridge
Univ. Press, 5th ed. 1995) (1832)). Other positivists, notably H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen, accepted the
notion of custom as a source of law even prior to formal adoption by judges or legislators. See id at 529
("Hart insists that many norms and sources can have the status of law. . . ." (citing H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 97-98 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., Claredon Press, 2d ed. 1994)
(1961)); id ("Kelsen ... recognized that 'norms created by custom do not differ radically from norms
created by acts of will.'" (quoting Richard Tur, 77e Kelsenian Enterprise, in ESSAYS ON KELSEN 149,
153 (Richard Tur & William Twining eds., 1986)).
" See Loux, supra note 174, at 201-02 ("According to Bentham, spontaneous custom gives rise to
legitimate expectations, but cannot create a binding legal obligation until it is legalized by a common
law court." (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, ACOMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIEs: A CRrTICISMOF WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAwS OF ENGLAND 221-23 (1928)).
m ALLEN, supra note 147, at 28; accord id at 28 n.l ("The standard definitions of custom in
English law never represent it as anything but filly valid and operative law in itself"); id at 85 ("[Tlhe
Austinian doctrine['s claim] that custom 'is not law' until it has been pronounced upon by a Court [is a
fallacy]. The exact reverse is the truth. Custom is the first and most essential aw. . . ."); Berman, supra
note 153, at 1711 n.161 ("Law ... is developed first by custom and by popular belief, and only then by
juristic activity." (citing FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIONY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Abraham Hayward trans., 3d. ed. 1831) (1813)).
23 See HUDSON, supra note 208, at 18 (observing that common law, that is, law common to the
entire realm of England, was recognized by the twelfth or thirteenth centuries).
224 See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAw AND REVOLUriON: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 438-41 (1983); HUDSON, supra note 208, at 19 (noting that the standard account is that
Henry II centralized English common law (citing I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FEDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 137-38 (2nd ed. rev.
1968) (1895); Postema, supra note 150, at 158 ("Historians credit Henry II, in the last third ofthe 12th
century, with introducing the institutional innovations that gave birth to the common law.").
BERMAN, supra note 224, at 441.
2 Id at 443-44; see also Postema, supra note 150, at 158 & n.7.
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the general customs of the realm, essentially creating the concept of English
common law.227 The final step in the process was the codification of some customs
into statutory law.2 8
Thus, common and statutory law is the end product of a long, slow, iterative
evolutionary process centered around custom and usage.29 First, individual persons
developed methods of accommodating the demands of society with the wants of the
individual by adopting practices in certain recurring situations. Second, the most
useful and attractive of these practices were imitated and adopted by others while
less desirable or productive ones fell by the wayside. Third, through this process of
imitation and adoption, practices became widespread and repeated enough to attain
the status of custom. At this point, the recognition of custom established rights and
interests that were legally enforceable. Finally, those legal rights and interests
started to become expressed by courts and legislators. Modem law, then, still
encompasses much ancient custom.230 Importantly, this process is still ongoing.231
B. The Persistence of Social Norms as Primordial Law
This evolutionary process-from practice to usage to custom to law-is not just
of historical concern. It continues to this day.2 3 2 True, we generally do not perceive
it happening on a day-to-day basis. But neither do we perceive life forms evolving
nor the earth getting warmer, though we know that these are occurring as well.
Methods of addressing the interactions between individuals and society are
continually practiced, adopted, repeated, and hardened into expectations that form
the basis of legal interests. And, critically, legal interests begin to exist even before
they are recognized in our positive law by statutes or judicial decrees.
Custom, of course, continues to exist. It continues as a system of social norms
that are "not necessarily recognized by the law, but enforceable by third party
sanction or by internal behavioral controls."233 Beginning with Robert Ellickson's
2 See BERMAN, supra note 224, at 456 ("It is this historical expansion of royal jurisdiction in the
reign of Henry II that marks the origin of English common law . . . ."); Postema, supra note 150, at 158
(observing that the common law created by Henry I "absorb[ed] and replac[cd] the regional law
structures of the pre-conquest period" and "cxercised ... monopoly jurisdiction over a very wide range
of legal matters .. ... ).
m See Miller, supra note 149, at 1827 ("Legislatures codified some customs into statutes.").
mJames L. Hufiman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years After Lucas, 35
ECOLOGY LQ. 1, 23 (2008) ("The common law is a formalization of custom . .. ."); Schauer, supra
note 198, at 531 ('[L]aw is principally, at least in the Hartian account, the internalization of a practice. .
. and the treatment of it as normative."); see also I HAYEK, supra note 146, at 77-78 ("T1be process of a
gradual articulation in words of what had long been an established practice must have been a slow and
complex one.").
mALLEN, supra note 147, at 86 ("Ancient customs ... are still an integral part of modern law ...
."); id at 102 (observing that custom "is the basis of many of our most fundamental Common Law
principles . . . .").
23 See Berman, supra note 153, at 1701-02 ("In Sciden's legal philosophy, history, custom, and
consent .... were ongoing in their nature.").
m See Loux, supra note 174, at 185 ("[C]ustom ... remained a significant source oflaw throughout
the nineteenth and into the twentieth century.").
m Miller, supra note 149, at 1831.
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groundbreaking work over twenty-five years ago,' a vast literature on social
norms has demonstrated the power of these norms as quasi-law.2 35 Whether readily
enforceable as law, such norms "can be as coercive as any positive law
promulgated by government agents."236 Such norms "can eventually harden into
what one might consider positive law."2 7 But, again, this hardening of norms into
law can occur well before any recognition by courts or legislatures.238
It is this last insight that is critical to understanding the deep connection
between the "trespass" and the "reasonable expectation of privacy" approaches.
That judges and academics have largely overlooked this connection stems in good
part from the judicial and academic obsession with reported appellate case law. For
most lawyers, if there is no reported case deciding an issue, the question is wide
open. While this is generally true from the standpoint of one contemplating a
course of action that might end up in litigation, it glosses over the extent to which
law exists even without reported appellate decisions. This is not to revive the long
discredited formalist notion that law somehow "exists" in some Platonic realm,
outside of what judges and legislators actually do. Far from it. It is to say, however,
that after custom finds wide enough acceptance through practice to become law,
but before that law ripens into legislation or reported cases, it exists in the practices
and experiences of people living together in a society. The law assigns rights and
responsibilities, authority and obligations, long before these interests and duties are
solidified in litigation and legislation.
To see how, observe how law is enforced on an everyday basis in situations
where black-letter law is clear. First, law is mostly self-executing. I refrain from
having a picnic lunch on my neighbor's front lawn uninvited not because I fear
being sued or prosecuted. Civil litigation, after all, is a time-consuming and costly
proposition. And, if I am otherwise on good terms with my neighbor, I very much
doubt that she will seek to have me prosecuted. I refrain from doing so because I
generally try to conform my behavior to what society expects of me, at least when
my failure to do so significantly infringes on other people's interests. In those
cases, failure to abide by generally accepted norms is met, not simply with a raised
eyebrow, but with opprobrium and ill will. I know that spreading out my blanket
2m See generally ROBERT C. ELICKSON, ORDER Wrniour LAW: How NEIGHBoRs SErrLs
DisPUTEs (1991) (exploring the interaction between social norms and legal rules to suggest hat people
successfully achieve order by using informal rules to govern themselves).
235 See, e.g., RICHARD MCADAMs, THE EXPRESSiVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LMITS
63-67 (2015); Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOCY
REV. 157 (2000); Douglas Litowitz, A Critical Take on Shasta County and the "New Chicago School,"
15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (2003); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to
Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 359 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 939-68 (1996).
mMiller, supra note 149, at 1831.
237 Id at 1832 n.136; see also Gregory M. Dubl, Property and Custom: Allocating Space in Public
Places, 79 TEMP. L REv. 199, 231 (2006) ("[Mlodern scholarship on social norms reinvigorates the
usefulness of custom as a source of law.").
2 Duhl, supra note 237, at 202 ("Members of communities abide by customs as normative and
binding, even though they are neither reflected in positive law ... nor in the common law." (footnote
omitted)); Sachs, supra note 198 (manuscript at 11) ("Th[e] move from custom to law can happen
without any judge's ruling needed to make it so. ..").
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and pulling out a sandwich on my neighbor's lawn adversely affects her right to
exclusive use of her property, which could lead to bad blood between us, in a way
that violation of other social norms, such as tending my garden in my pajamas,
does not.
Another reason I refrain from dining al fresco without permission in my
neighbor's yard has much to do with my neighbor's legal rights but still has little to
do with litigation. Legal rights can be enforced through self-help. Trespassing on
her lawn not only will give rise to bad blood but also gives her the right to use
ordinary physical force to remove me and I have no legal right to fight back. This
may cause bumps, cuts, and bruises, both to my body and my ego, and could well
harm my picnic blanket and destroy my sandwich.
These enforcement mechanisms of the law-self-execution and
self-help-operate alongside the traditional civil and criminal remedies my
neighbor has to address my incursion. However, these mechanisms operate ven
when the law is less than clear and even when there may be no civil or criminal
remedies at all. As Professor Laurent Sacharoff has pointed out, for example, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts distinguishes between actionable and non-actionable
trespasses to chattels." While any intermeddling with another person's property is
a trespass to chattel,24 only a smaller universe of such trespasses, those that
damage or destroy the property or deprive the owner of its use, give rise to a tort
action for damages.24' Yet the recognition of even non-actionable trespasses to
chattel confers significant rights and obligations, such as the right of the property
owner to use force to end such a trespass and the obligation of the trespasser not to
fight back 242 Tort and property law thus assign rights and responsibilities even
without providing for damage actions; rights can be created and respected even
without litigation and reported cases.
This is particularly true of the kinds of low-stakes events-otherwise trivial
trespasses to chattel and real property-that become high-stakes only under
unusual circumstances. Take, for example, ownership rights in balls batted into the
stands at baseball games. Imagine three spectators, Felipe, Jesus, and Matty, sitting
in the stands near each other at a baseball game. At bat is a mediocre player for the
visiting team, someone hitting just south of the "Mendoza Line." 243 The batter hits
a Laurent Sacharoff Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 906-07 (2014).
'o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("A trespass to chattel may
be committed by intentionally ... intenneddling with a chattel in the possession of another.").
" Id § 218 (positing that a trespasser to chattel is liable to its possessor only if the trespasser
"dispossesses the other of the chattel . . . impairis] its condition, quality, or value," deprives the
possessor "of the use of the chattel for a substantial time," or the possessor suffers bodily harm "or harm
is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest"); see also
Sacharoff, supra note 239, at 906-07.
2 Sacharoff supra note 239, at 907 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 cmt a (AM.
LAW INsT. 1965)).
" For those who are not baseball aficionados, the "Mendoza Line," named for former major league
shortstop Mario Mendoza, is a .200 batting average, which is popularly thought to be the cutoff for any
player to remain in the major leagues. See Chris Landers, How Did Mario Mendoza Become a
Shorthand for Batting Futility?, MLB.COM (May 22, 2018, 8:19 AM), https://www.mlb.com/cut4/how-
did-the-mendoza-line-become-an-mlb-tenn/c-277392972 [https://permacc/9PA9-SKAQ]. Thus,
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a lazy foul ball into the stands in the direction of our three fans, and they all go for
the ball. Jesus, standing between the other two, grasps the ball and momentarily has
it under his control, but just as he grasps it, Matty, in a bona fide effbrt to catch the
ball, jostles Jesus enough so that the ball pops out of his hands. Felipe then grabs
the ball and maintains control over it. Who owns the ball?
Prior to about fifteen years ago, one could search the case reports far and wide
without finding an answer to this question. Is that because this issue just never
arose? That seems highly unlikely. Well over 200,000 Major League Baseball
games have been played.2" It has been estimated that between 2.44 and 2.7 foul
balls enter the stands at a baseball game every inning.2 45 Assume that the average
baseball game lasts 8.3 innings, to account both for games won by the home team
before its last at-bat and for rain-shortened games.246 Based on a conservative
estimate of 2.5 foul balls per inning and 200,000 games, about 4.15 million foul
balls have been hit into the stands at Major League Baseball games. If a scenario
similar to the one I have described occurs only once every thousand times a foul
ball enters the stands, again a conservative estimate, there should have been about
4,150 disputes over foul balls that involve such a fact pattern. Where are the reports
of all of these lawsuits?
The answer, of course, is that people do not generally sue over foul balls,
particularly those hit by nonentities. While people will instinctively go for a ball
that is hit in their direction, and will make reasonable efforts to snag a souvenir,
most are unwilling to go to court when things do not break their way. Imagine, for
example, what Jesus might do in the above scenario. He might just let it go. Or he
might try to explain to Felipe that he first laid hands on the ball, so it is his. Felipe,
for his part might accommodate Jesus in his contention that the ball is actually his,
or he might firmly refuse to turn the ball over. Either way, the dispute, to the extent
that there is one, is unlikely to go further than the grandstand.247
Now, ramp up the stakes. Imagine that the ball is not a foul hit by some
nonentity but Barry Bonds's record-breaking 731 home run ball, hit on Oct. 7,
2001, estimated at the time to be worth upwards of $1 million.248 That occurrence,
someone hitting "just south of the Mendoza Linc"--just below .200-may not last very long as a major
league ballplayer.
m Baseball's 200,000"' game was played on Sept 24, 2011. See Mark Newman, MLB's 200,000th
Game Played in Houston, ASTROS.COM (Sept. 25, 2011, 12:24 AM),
http://wap.mlb.com/hou/news/article/2011092125015352/1ocale=en_US [https://penna.cct8T2C-
QCJ9].
24s See Bob Gorman, How Many Foul Balls Enter the Stands?, DEATH AT THE BALLPARK (Oct 6,
2010), httpsi/deathattheballpark.wordpress.com/2010/10/06/how-many-foul-balls-enter-the-stands/
[httpsI/perma.cc/9NV4-WTQT].
S2 "is, of course, is a conservative estimate because of the frequency of games that go into extra
innings.
247 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SocIAL NoRMS 12 (2000) ("[L]cgal proceedings are costly and
clumsy, so people cannot rely on the law to solve day-to-day cooperative problems."). The definitive
law review article on this topic, Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Baseballs and Abandoned Property: Who
Owns the Home Run Ball?, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 1609 (2002), does not cite a single case of any kind
involving a dispute over a ball--foul or otherwise-hit into the stands.
m See Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *I & n.l (Cal. Super. Ct Dec. 18,
2002). Ultimately, the ball sold for $450,000. See Ira Berkow, 73rd Home Run Ball Sells for $450,000,
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which resulted in an incident not unlike the story of Jesus, Matty, and
Felippe (though involving many more actors) famously generated a lawsuit,
Popov v. Hayashi.249 The court initially had to decide an issue of first impression:
when does a fan obtain possession of a ball hit into the stands?250 Plaintiff Popov,
who momentarily had control of the ball and lost it when other fans besieged him,
argued "that possession occurs when an individual intends to take control of [the]
ball and manifests that intent by stopping the forward momentum of the ball
whether or not complete control is achieved."2 5' Defendant Hayashi, who
ultimately obtained full control of the ball, predictably "argue[d] that possession
does not occur until the fan has complete control of the ball." 252
Because there was no case law on this precise issue, one might think that the
court was writing on a clean slate. However, this would be an error. There is, in
fact, a "common law of baseball," as it were,253 and it is based on custom. Although
there have been cases involving contested claims of possession in other contexts,254
the court found these of limited utility because property rules "are influenced by
the custom and practice of each industry."255 In agreeing with the defendant's
position, the court focused on the norms of baseball fandom- "The custom and
practice of the stands creates a reasonable expectation that a person will achieve
full control of a ball before claiming possession."25 6 It was only a short step from
recognition of this norm to creation of a parallel legal rule.257
As with our baseball analogy, litigation is not the most likely byproduct of
low-level intrusions upon security of persons or property by private citizens. This
explains why Justice Alito's dissent in Jardines v. Florida2" misses the mark.
Again, in that case, the Court held that bringing a drug dog to the front door of a
house violates the Fourth Amendment because it involved an unconsented-to,
physical intrusion onto property.' The court reasoned that license could not be
implied because there is no accepted customary social practice of approaching the
front door of a home to seek information other than by knocking and speaking to an
occupant.26 Justice Alito complained that any prohibition on this practice was
N.Y. TIMEs (June 26, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/26/sports/baseball-73rd-home-run-ball-
sells-for-450000.html [https://perna.ccd5CC8-DXXG].
m Popov, 2002 WL 31833731.
2m See Id at *3.
2 1 Id at *5.
m Id at *4.
25 The phrase "common law of baseball" originates from Finkelman, supra note 247, at 1621-24.
However, Professor Finkelman uses it to discuss the less controversial proposition that baseball fans
may keep balls hit into the stands. Id
' See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731 at *5 (citing "cases involving the hunting or fishing of wild
animals [and] the salvage of sunken vessels" (footnotes omitted)).
255 id
2Id
' See id ("There is no reason for the legal rule to be inconsistent with that expectation."). The
court went on, however, to find that the assault on Popov that arguably prevented him from maintaining
possession of the ball also had to be taken into account. See id at *6-7.
m 569 U.S. 1, 16-26 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
a Id at 11-12 (majority opinion).26 Id at 7-10.
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wholly absent from "the annals of Anglo-American jurisprudence."2" As Justice
Alito put it: "If bringing a tracking dog to the front door of a home constituted a
trespass, one would expect at least one case to have arisen during the past 700
years. But the Court has found none."262
But this complaint proves too much. Justice Alito, after all, was unable to point
to any decision within the last 700 years permitting the bringing of a tracking dog
to the front door of a private home. One possibility, of course, is that the custom
permitting this conduct has been so well established in every English-speaking
jurisdiction for the past eight centuries that no one ever bothered to challenge it.
Another possibility is that the custom forbidding such conduct is so clear that
everyone abides by it. But neither seems likely. It seems far more likely that the
conduct has been practiced sporadically since Magna Carta, it has likely been
objected to on occasion, and these objections may have even ripened into litigation
in a handful of cases, but no litigation resulted in any reported cases.263 Only the
legal profession's obsession with reported appellate decision can explain Justice
Alito's facile conclusion that, because neither side could find a reported case, not
even "one case ... ha[s] arisen during the past 700 years."264
C. Everything Old is New Again: The Trespass Test As the Expectations Test
The Court's two recent cases in which it supposedly reintroduced the "old"
trespass provide excellent examples of how that trespass test operates much like the
Katz expectations test but in a different guise. In both United States v. Jones and
Florida v. Jardines, there was a literal, physical intrusion onto private property for
the purpose of seeking information: in Jones, a GPS transmitter was placed
surreptitiously on an automobile;26s in Jardines, police took a drug-sniffing dog to
the front door of a home to detect drugs within." Given these clear physical
intrusions, the real question lay elsewhere. The main issue in Jones was, in essence,
whether the placement of the device was de minimis, while Jardines came down to
whether there was implicit consent o the intrusion.
But these issues of de minimis intrusion and implied license boil down to
questions about social expectations, understandings, and norms. For instance, one
could argue that the placing of the GPS device on the vehicle in Jones while it was
parked in a public lot, although a technical physical intrusion, was no greater an
intrusion than the common practice of placing a restaurant ake-out menu under the
car's windshield wiper. Whether the latter practice is acceptable can be answered
only with respect to prevailing social norms. There might be a strongly held belief
that such behavior is improper, which could stem from (1) the abridgement of
26 Id at 16 (Alito, J., dissenting).
2 Id at 23.
' See Loux, supra note 174, at 184 ("Disputes over custom reached the common law courts when
the property right at issue was of such a value that a party was willing, or able, to undertake the xpense
of litigation.").
mJardines, 569 U.S. at 23 (Alito, J., dissenting).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,402-03 (2012).
2 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 3-4.
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people's rights to exclusive use of their chattels, (2) the annoyance people feel in
having to remove the offending menus from their windshields before driving,
(3) the increased littering that takes place when the removed menus are not
properly disposed of, or (4) any combination of these.
It is unlikely that such a norm will have ever hardened into case law-what are
the odds that an aggrieved driver will sue over a take-out menu, much less take the
issue on appeal where it might result in a reported decision?-but it is recognizable
as a norm nonetheless. For example, restaurants might abide by this informal norm
for fear of losing business or simply out of a desire to abide by prevailing societal
norms. Such a norm might even give rise to enforceable legal rights and obligations
despite an absence of case law. For example, when a driver catches the restaurant
worker in the act and demands that she desist, and she refuses, the car owner might
be privileged to use reasonable force to end the intrusion, such as by grabbing the
offender's arm. By contrast, absent such a cognizable right, one might have to wait
until after the menu is placed and then remove it; grabbing the arm of the person
placing the menu might be considered a battery in tort or even a minor form of
criminal assault.
But whatever the reasons behind a norm opposing such a practice, and whatever
form it takes-societal disapproval, cognizable right, or criminal or civil
ordinance-car owners within such a regime would expect not to have strangers
place objects on their cars without their consent. If so, the rule established by
Jones was correct-even a de minimis interference with property violates societal
norms and is therefore a search if undertaken in order to gather information. On the
other hand, car owners might take a more laissez-faire approach, allowing de
minimis interference with property that does not damage it or lessen its value. If so,
then the rule established by Jones is more doubtful.267
Thus, the "trespass" question at the heart of Jones can be answered only in
terms of societal norms, understandings, and expectations surrounding de minimis
intrusions on personalty. That is to say, the analysis in cases that, like Jones,
involve physical intrusions to personal property devolve into a very Katz-like
methodology. A court must determine to what extent individuals expect to have
their property tampered with by other members of society. This question can be
answered only by reference to prevailing social norms, whether or not reflected by
positive law.
Seen in this light, Jones is virtually indistinguishable from Bond v. United
States, despite the fact that Jones was decided under the "trespass" rubric' and
Bond under the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.269 Recall that the Court in
Bond held that bus passengers had a reasonable xpectation that their soft luggage
would not be physically manipulated in an exploratory manner by other passengers,
a Of course, the GPS device differs from the menu in that the former is placed surreptitiously, and
one might object to secret, de minimis interferences with chattel even if one has no objection to de
minimis interferences generally. The point is that whether placement of the GPS device was a Fourth
Amendment search begins with societal norms about de minimis intrusions on personal property, though
it may not end there.
nJones, 565 U.S. at 4044)5.
2 Bond v. tited States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
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so that when a police officer did so for the purpose of discovering information, he
conducted a search.2 70 Like Jones, Bond involved what one might deem a de
minimis intrusion on personal property, one that neither damaged it nor detracted
from its value.271 And, as in Jones, the Bond Court held that even some de minimis
intrusions violate widely shared social norms so that, when conducted to discover
information, they constitute searches.m
At the same time, Bond demonstrates how the societal norms that undergird the
Katz test do not necessarily boil down to the subjective preferences of a majority of
the Supreme Court.273 To see why, imagine that the duffel bag in that case had been
massaged forensically by another bus passenger rather than a police officer, and
that Bond had caught her in the act. One would suppose that our hypothetical Bond
might have every right to demand that she stop, and that he further might have
every right to use force if she persisted.274 One could reach this conclusion even if
they could find no case on point declaring a right to have one's luggage free from
exploratory manhandling, whether in a civil or criminal litigation against the
offending manhandler, or in a civil or criminal action against the owner for assault,
on his defense of property claim.
Likewise, and perhaps more obviously, Jardines devolves into questions about
societal expectations. What divided the Court was not whether there was a physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area for the purpose of gathering
information: all agreed that he police officer and his canine companion breached
the curtilage of a private home in order to detect odors coming from within.275 The
271 See id
m Id Given their similarities, it is surprising that Jones cites Bond only once, and only for the
general proposition that the Court's "later cases have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan's
concurrence in [Katz], which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person's
'reasonable expectation of privacy."' Jones, 529 U.S. at 406. It is also surprising that Justice Scalia
dissented in Bond given that he authored the majority opinion in Jones and while he was on the Court,
he was perhaps its fiercest critic of Katz and its biggest proponent of a physical-intrusion-based
approach. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (observing that "[t]he
Katz test ... has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable."); Minnesota
v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the Katz test as "notoriously
unhelpful" and "self-indulgent"); see also Orin Kerr, Scalia's Votes in Bond and Jones, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 25, 2012, 2:05 PM), http:I/volokh.comi/2012/01/25/scalias-votes-in-bond-and-jones/
[https://perma.cc/AA7S-46M4] (suggesting that Justice Scalia's votes in the two cases are
irreconcilable). And only a few commentators have seen this connection between Bond and Jones. See,
e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party
Doctrine, 14 N.C. J. L & TECH. 431, 439 & n.44 (2013) (observing that the holdings of the two cases
are "consistent" with one another); Laurent Sacharoff, The Binary Search Doctrine, 42 HoFSTRA L.
REv. 1139, 1177 n.272 (2014) (observing that "the squeezing of luggage . . . counts as a Fourth
Amendment search under the holding of Jones, as well as the privacy rationale of Bond").
Contra Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[U]nsurprisingly, those 'actual
(subjective) expectation[s] of privacy' 'that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable,"' . . . bear
an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable." (citation
omitted and alterations in original)).
m By contrast, Bond almost certainly would not have had any right to forcibly prevent a fellow
passenger from simply moving his bag to make room for her own luggage.
27 Jardines v. Florida, 569 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2013).
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only issue was whether the breach was implicitly consented to,276 given the fact
that, by having a walkway leading up to his front door, Jardines implicitly licensed
others, including strangers, to travel the route to his front door.277 Resolution of that
issue hinged entirely on societal norms, customs, and understandings, the same
touchstone of the Katz test.
The Court began its discussion by quoting language from its 1922 decision in
McKee v. Gratz that "[a] license may be implied from the habits of the country."27 8
It acknowledged that customarily there is an implicit license for strangers "to
approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received,
and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave."" But, it continued, there is no
customary license to approach the front door of a house via the front path and
refrain from knocking, and instead "explore the area around the home in hopes of
discovering incriminating evidence."280 For his part, Justice Alito in dissent agreed
that whether a license could be implied hinged on social customs and norms. He
cited cases for the propositions that it is not customary to visit another's home in
the dead of night,28 ' and that "an invitation [can be] implied from. .. custom."282
He merely disagreed that the police in Jardines went against the grain of these
societal customs and norms.m And he provided his own examples of such customs
and norms permitting visitors to approach the door without knocking in order to
seek information, such as the motorist approaching to discern a house number not
easily observable from the roadway.' Thus, what separated the majority from the
dissent in Jardines was their respective discernment of prevailing social norms and
customs relating to visiting a stranger's home.
- Id at 8 ("As it is undisputed that the detectives had all four of their feet and all four of their
companion's feet firmly planted on the constitutionally protected extension of Jardines' home, the only
question is whether he had given his leave (even implicitly) for them to do so.").
I See id ("[TJhc knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry,
justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds." (quoting Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951) (alteration added)).
mld (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922) (alteration added)). McKee had involved
whether there was an implicit license to trawl for mussels in a riverbed on another's property. McKee,
260 U.S. at 134-36.
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8.
Id at 9. The use of the word "incriminating" here is unfortunate. Given that the touchstone is
what we expect of private citizens, not just the police, it should not matter whether the information
sought is incriminating, exculpating, or neutral. The Court seemed to make this clear in other passages
from the critical portion of the opinion. See, e.g., id at 9 n3 ("We think a typical person would find it a
cause for great alarm . .. to find a stranger snooping about his front porch with or without a dog."
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); id at 9 n.4 ('[N]o one is impliedly invited to enter the
protected premises of the home in order to do nothing but conduct a search."); id at 9 (opining that no
implied license would include a "visitor exploring the front path with a metal detector").
a Id at 20 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Cada, 923 P.2d 469, 478 (Idaho App. 1996)).
mId at 19 (quoting Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Kane, 131 A.2d 470,473-74 (Md. 1957) (alteration
added)).
m See id at 20-21 ("As I understand the law of trespass and the scope of the implied license, a
visitor ... is not necessarily required to ring the doorbell, knock on the door, or attempt to speak with an
occupant.").
m Id at 21.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The third-party consent cases, and particularly Georgia v. Randolph,28 5 run
directly parallel to this reasoning, despite the fict that they were decided pursuant
to a Katzian methodology and Jardines is a "trespass" case. What separated the
majority and the dissent in Randolph was their respective understanding of social
norms and customs that govern when one of two co-occupants consents to entry by
a third party and the other is present and objects.2 86 The majority held that the
objecting occupant's refusal to consent trumped the putative consent provided by
the other occupant, while the dissent would have held the other way around.287
At its foundation, Randolph, like Jardines, is a case about license: does a third
party have license to enter premises when one occupant consents and one objects?
And as in Jardines, the question can be answered only in terms of prevailing social
norms. The Randolph Court began with the observation that co-occupants typically
operate under certain understandings "about their common authority when they
share quarters."2 88 One of those understandings is that "any one of them may admit
visitors, with the consequence that a guest obnoxious to one may nevertheless be
admitted in his absence by another."289 However, the Court wrote, understandings
change when the objector is present. Where one occupant has invited the guest
inside but another is standing there and "saying, 'stay out' . . . . no sensible person
would go inside," absent "some very good reason."2 The "customary social
understanding" under those circumstances, then, is that there is no license to
enter.29' The point is not that the Randolph Court discerned that "customary social
understanding" correctly. Maybe, maybe not. The point is that, wrong or right, the
Court's use of social norms and customs to discern whether there was a license to
enter the Randolph home is virtually indistinguishable from the use of social norms
and customs to discern whether there was a license to approach the Jardines home.
Randolph also appealed to the mutually constitutive nature of social norms and
social practice when the majority surmised that "[w]ithout some very good reason,
no sensible person would go inside under those conditions."2" The Court thus
posited that guests would generally abide by the objecting occupant's wishes.29
This was reflective of the social norm in place. In turn, general acquiescence to this
norm confirms and fortifies the norm to the point where it might have matured into
a cognizable legal right.
Further, as with Bond, Randolph shows us that these prevailing social norms
often harden into cognizable legal rights even without reported appellate decisions.
Imagine, for example, that the person requesting entry in Randolph had not been a
police officer but instead a friend of Mrs. Randolph's. Had Mrs. Randolph invited
her friend inside the house, and had Mr. Randolph objected, and had the friend
a 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
Id at 113-115; Id at 141-42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id at 113-115 (majority opinion); Id at 141-42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id at 111 (majority opinion).
n9 Id
mMd at 113.
29Id at 121.
2Id at 113.
293 d at 114.
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entered, would the friend be civilly or criminally liable for trespass? And would
Mr. Randolph have been within his rights to forcibly remove the guest? If the
answer to either question is "yes," then the result in Randolph is probably correct.
If the answer is "no," then the dissent in Randolph probably had the better view.
Unfortunately, neither the majority nor the dissent cited any cases in which this
issue arose, either in a civil or criminal case for trespass against the arguably
encroaching guest or, more likely, a civil or criminal case against the objecting
owner for the potentially unjustifiable assault. But just because there may not be
any reported appellate decisions does not mean that here is no law.
In sum, what connects the "reasonable expectation of privacy" cases and the
"trespass" cases is far stronger than what separates them. Under both rubrics, the
Court has looked to prevailing social norms and customs to determine the scope of
the Fourth Amendment. Each framework has as its touchstone customary social
understandings governing individual interests in security from intrusions by other
private individuals upon their persons and property.
III. Two IMPLICATIONS OF THE POST-JONES SYNTHESIS: UNIFICATION AND
DECENTRALIZATION
At least two implications flow from the central insight that customary social
usage is really at the heart of both the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard
and the "trespass" test. First, one can articulate a unified approach to the Fourth
Amendment search question: a Fourth Amendment search occurs when, for the
purpose of gathering information, government agents act contrary to law, broadly
conceived-that is, law in whatever stage of evolutionary development-protecting
us from intrusion by private actors in our persons, houses, papers, and effects.
Breach of positive law is thus sufficient but not necessary to make out a Fourth
Amendment search under those circumstances. Second, the pursuit of uniform
national rules on what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search" is misguided.
Societal norms regarding security from private intrusions will sometimes vary from
place to place. Decentralizing Fourth Amendment search doctrine is also more
consistent with the framers' and ratifiers' vision of the Fourth Amendment as a
reservation of local control of federal search-and-seizure policy. In short, the
Fourth Amendment search question should be unified rather than dichotomous, but
decentralized rather than monolithic.
A. Unifying the Fourth Amendment Search Inquiry
Cases decided under either the "reasonable expectation of privacy" approach or
the "trespass" approach come down to the same essential touchstone: social norms
governing security from private intrusions. Accordingly, there is no reason for the
courts to continue to pretend that hese are two separate approaches. Instead, both
are encompassed by a single, easily-stated standard noted above: a Fourth
Amendment search occurs when, for the purpose of gathering information,
government agents act contrary to law, broadly conceived-that is, law in whatever
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stage of evolutionary development-protecting us from intrusion by private actors
in our persons, houses, papers, and effects.
Pursuant to this approach, violation by government officials of positive law in
their quest for information is sufficient but not necessary to make out a Fourth
Amendment violation. It is sufficient because a violation of positive law could have
formed the basis for a common-law tort suit in 1791. Thus, a positive-law-based
approach is close to an originalist account of Fourth Amendment search doctrine,
even one that is premised on the continuing evolution of tort law. But a violation of
positive law is not necessary to make out a Fourth Amendment search because, as
has been shown, custom and norms can attain the status of law even before they are
engrained in what we might recognize as positive law. Thus, the "positive law
model" of Fourth Amendment searches, comprehensively set forth recently by
Professors Will Baude and James Stern,' does not quite seem to capture all
government conduct that should be considered searches.
Baude and Stern argue that a Fourth Amendment search has occurred when
"government officials have engaged in an investigative act hat would be unlawful
for a similarly situated private actor to perform."295 This could occur in either of
two circumstances where governmental officials seek to obtain information9 first,
where they do so in violation of "a generally applicable law" governing private
conduct; and second, where, in doing so, they take advantage of a special
governmental exemption from such a law.29
The "positive law model" is a good start, and superior to current law. It avoids
much of the indeterminacy of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" approach.2
It also has the benefit of keeping easy cases easy. Take, for example,
Cahifornia v. Greenwood, in which police had rummaged through the defendant's
trash to find incriminating evidence.' The Court presumed to discern the
sensibilities of the average American in determining that he or she has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in trash. " But there was no need to take such a
metaphysical journey. The people of the State of California had already
determined, in their constitution, as interpreted by the state courts, that government
officials were forbidden from engaging in this activity."o' Local ordinances
extended that same prohibition to private citizens." 2 In that case, the social norms
of the community had hardened into positive law against the practice, and the
aSee generally Baude & Stern, supra note 136.
m Id at 1825; see also Note, The Fourth Amendment's Third Way, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1627, 1632
(2007) (arguing that "what is reasonablc" under the Fourth Amendment "is that which is lawful under
state law," and "inversely, what is unreasonable is that which is unlawful under state law").
I See Baude & Stern, supra note 136, at 1833 (clarifying that "[a] search requires an action
generally likely to obtain information.").
297Id at 1825-26, 1831.
m See id at 1852 ("Rather than divining social understandings ... the positive law model cals for
the bread and butter of the legal profession-doctrinal analysis.").
m California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37-38 (1988).
3w See id at 39-43.
" Id at 43 (citing People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971)).
See California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 325 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
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government conduct would have been considered a search pursuant either to Baude
and Stem's approachos or to mine.30
But the "positive law" approach apparently would not cover violations of those
social norms that have not yet solidified into legislation or common-law decisions.
It is unclear, for example, what Baude and Stern would say about Bond v. United
States.0 ' Recall that there the Supreme Court held that a search had occurred when
a government agent physically manipulated Bond's soft-sided luggage in an
invasive manner to determine if it contained drugs.31 Under the approach
advocated in this Article, this was a search if it would have violated an established
societal norm for a private person to have done the same. Recall that the
Restatement (Second) of Torts would likely consider this a non-actionable tort."
Some language used by Baude and Stem suggests that their positive law model
would hold this to be a search. For example, at one point, they write that the
question is whether "the government actor [has] done something that would be
tortious, criminal, or otherwise a violation of some legal duty?"sos However, they
later define a legal duty in terms of some "prohibitory legal provision[], whether
legislative, judicial, or administrative in origin." 3" This language does not support
the idea of leveraging a non-actionable tort, not otherwise recognized in law, into-a
Fourth Amendment search. That it is non-actionable means that few, if any,
lawsuits would arise from it, so there might be no judicial decision for the object of
the government conduct to point to. Thus, what the positive law model would do
with a case like Bond hinges on what Baude and Stem mean by "positive law." If
they mean a strictly Austinian approach whereby positive law comes into being
only with a decree by a sovereign entity," 0 then there may well have been no
search in Bond. If they contemplate a more generous, Hartian approach to positive
law,"' then there likely was a search in Bond. By contrast, an approach that
recognizes customs and social norms as potential sources of legal rights and
interests generates no such ambiguity.
At the same time, the Baude & Stern approach can sweep too much conduct
into the "search" column if the positive law at issue has no connection to security
in our "persons, houses, papers, and effects." As Professor Richard Re noted, "the
positive law model is triggered ... when a legal violation occurs 'in the course' of
a See Baude & Stern, supra note 136, at 1881-82 (discussing Greenwood).
' Or to Justice Gorsuch's. He recently critiqued Greenwood as an example of how the Katz
approach has ftiled, and argued in favor of an approach that more explicitly relies on positive law. See
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2266 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (observing that most
peoplc would not approve of "a neighbor rummaging through their garbage," and that this expectation
coalesced into positive law in California).
529 U.S. 334 (2000).
3 Id. at 335-36.
' See supra text accompanying notes 239-242.
3 Baude & Stern, supra note 136, at 1825 (emphasis added).
3m See id at 1833.
310 See AusTIN, supra note 220, at 142 (equating positive law with the commands of the sovereign).
3" See Schauer, sUpra note 198, at 528 ("For Hart, a rule of recognition could, but need not,
recognize custom as law, and more specifically as law existing prior to judicial application.").
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a search - but is that requirement emporal, causal, or purposive?"3 12 Suppose, for
example, that a police officer is carrying a through-the-wall imager, like those
discussed in Kyllo v. United States, that can make out objects in the house through
opaque walls."'3 Suppose further that possession of such a device has been banned
by local law. Our officer walks up to someone's front door in the middle of the day
and knocks, and immediately smells the distinctive odor of burning marijuana. A
literal understanding of the Baude & Stern approach would indicate that a search
has occurred, since a positive law violation-possession of the imager-occurred
"in the course of' the conduct.314 But because there is no nexus between the illegal
possession of the device and the security of the home, this violation of positive law
should not be deemed sufficient to make the conduct a search. If on the other hand,
the officer were to use the illegal device to determine who or what was in the
home, even if she did so from beyond the curtilage, a search has occurred: the
officer has violated a law in a way that diminishes our security in our houses from
intrusion by other private persons.
This is not to say that such an approach would not encounter difficult cases. If
custom can become law even prior to judicial pronouncement, when exactly does
that occur? Down the long road from practice to imitation to custom to law,
enforceable legal interests come into being at some point. But that point will be
hard to pin down with precision. For example, in Florida v. Jardines, the Court
split 5-4 on whether there is an implied license to come to the front door of
someone's home, refrain from knocking, and search the porch for evidence for a
brief period of time.'" Recognizing that that issue is no different from those raised
in most cases decided under the reasonable expectation of privacy test is an
important step. However, that view, in and of itselt gets us no closer to an answer.
But, then again, neither does the positive law model. Baude and Stem argue that
the Jardines Court should have looked to "the law of Florida as of the time that [the
drug dog] sniffed around the porch."' Fair enough. But, if Justice Alito was
correct that there was no case on point in Florida (or anywhere else)," the positive
law model also gives us no answer.1 I
There is, however, a solution for cases such as Jardines, where there is no
statute or judicial pronouncement on point and the question of customary social
usage is a close one. It is a solution that is entirely consistent with the view of
common law as the culmination of custom. It is the same tried-and-true mechanism
familiar to centuries of common-law development: jury-decision-making. Where
312 Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARv. L. REv. F. 313, 320 (2016) (citation omitted
and emphasis in original).
3o Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 n.3 (2001) ("The ability to 'see' through walls and other
opaque barriers is a clear, and scientifically feasible, goal of law enforcement research and
development.").
"' See Re, supra note 312, at 315 (providing similar examples).
3" Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2013); id at 1421 (Alito, J., dissenting).3
1 Baude & Stern, supra note 136, at 1836.317 See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 23 (Alito, J., dissenting).
31 In all fairness, Baude and Stern recognize this point See Baude & Stern, supra note 136, at 1850
("[The positive law model] is only as predictable as the underlying positive law . . . ").
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legal standards are stated in generalities, such as the negligence standard in tort, we
have historically trusted juries to apply these abstract standards to the concrete facts
of actual cases. It is entirely consistent with this history to ask juries to draw lines
when it comes to contestable assertions of infiingement of security in our "persons,
houses, papers, and effects,"'3 9 and to separate mere annoyances that must be
tolerated from true abridgments of incipient legal interests. Such a practice is also
true to the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment, which largely
depended on juries to enforce search-and-seizure constraints on federal agents.320
B. Decentralizing the Fourth Amendment Search Inquiry
As shown above, the "reasonable xpectation of privacy" test and the "trespass"
test both use as their touchstone customary social understandings.32' Irrespective of
whether those understandings have evolved into positive law or remain at the level
of norms, those understandings sometimes differ by State, and even by locality.
Incorporating this type of differentiation into the Fourth Amendment would be
consistent both with the likely views of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourth
Amendment that local law would continue to govern search-and-seizure policy and
with the ancient English common law recognition of local custom as law. One
might say that like all politics, all searches-or at least virtually all-are local. -
While the "trespass" and the "reasonable expectation of privacy" cases come
from different directions, they do agree on at least one point: they manifest a
distinct aversion to having the Fourth Amendment search inquiry hinge on local
conditions.322 The de-coupling of Fourth Amendment search doctrine from local
positive law did not begin with Katz v. United States.3 1- It showed up no later than
Olmstead v. United States, in which the Court cared not one whit about the fact that
the federal agents there had committed a criminal wiretapping offense under the
laws of Washington.324 Indeed, across decades of cases, we see an almost fetishistic
obsession with national uniformity: the Silverman Court's caution-twice
repeated in as many pages of the U.S. Reports-that it was not calibrating the
Fourth Amendment search question to "local law";325 the Greenwood Court's
back-of-the-hand rejection of the idea that the Fourth Amendment search question
m19 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
3 Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
359,360-61 (1994). This idea is explored more fully infra text accompanying notes 343 to 355.
nlSee supra Section II.D.
mSee Baude & Stern, supra note 136, at 1858 ("The Supreme Court ... has at times scoffed at the
idea that Fourth Amendment protections would 'vary from place to place . . . .'" (quoting Virginia v.
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (alteration added)).
' See 389 U.S. 347, 370 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The majority's decision here relies heavily
on the statement ... that the Court 'necd not pause to consider whether or not there was a technical
trespass under the local property law . ... " (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)).
m Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,468-69 (1928).
" Silverman, 365 U.S. 505, 512, 513 (1961).
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might "depend[] on the law of the particular State";326 and the Jardines Court's
punctilious avoidance even of the use of the term "trespass."327
But if the search question really boils down to social norms, then this obsession
with national uniformity is misguided.328 First, at the time of the framing, custom
was thought to sometimes differ by locale. The treatment of general custom as
common law is a big part of the story of the development of the common law, but it
is only a part. Some customs were strictly local in nature. Blackstone recognized
this early on in the third section of his Commentaries, entitled "Of the Laws of
England."2 9 He wrote that the unwritten law of England "includes not only general
customs, or the common law properly so called; but also the particular customs of
certain parts of the kingdom."330 According to Blackstone, even after the bulk of
common law was aggregated and unified, "particular counties, cities, towns,
manors, and lordships, were very early indulged with the privilege of abiding by
their own customs."3 ' These local customs often spring from, and are preserved
because of local conditions not generally shared.3 3 2
And even after custom matures into common law, common law in the United
States turns out not to be so "common" at all. With fifty States, we potentially have
at least as many versions of the common law. Proponents of a positive law model
for Fourth Amendment searches embrace the idea that what is a search in one State
might not be a search in another.3 After all, the social norms that are reflected in
positive law will often differ by State." Baude and Stem tout this as a Brandeisian
benefit335 of their positive law model: "The positive law model can ... draw on the
advantages of decentralization within a federal system. Different jurisdictions can
experiment with different approaches to individual issues, learning from one
3 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,43 (1988).
n Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013); see also Baude & Stem, supra note 136, at 1835
(observing that Jones and Jardines "treated the Fourth Amendment as borrowing the general look and
feel of trespassory actions, not as formally incorporating the background law of property").
" But see Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 IND. LJ. 369, 40&-15 (2018)
(critiquing the view that Fourth Amendment issues should be determined locally).
-I BLACKSTONE, supra note 163, at *63.
' Id (emphasis omitted).
3 Id at *74.
3 See ALLEN, supra note 147, at 56-57.
333 Baude & Stern, supra note 136, at 1874 ("[A]pplication of the positive law model will frequently
be ... jurisdiction-specific . . . ."); Note, supra note 295, at 1645 ("[]f the goal is to reflect social
convention accurately then the doctrinal test should recognize interstate differences."); see also
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct 2206, 2270 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (suggesting an
approach whereby the Fourth Amendment search inquiry depends on part on "state-created rights"). But
see Re, supra note 312, at 321 (criticizing the positive law model for making "Fourth Amendment riles
... jurisdictionally variable").
* See Note, supra note 295, at 1645 ("It is likely that commonly held understandings about privacy
do indeed differ by state, and dynamic incorporation would allow the Fourth Amendment to reflect these
nuances.").
`sSee New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory-, and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.").
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another or fashioning the legal practices best suited for their particular
conditions."336
But more important than policy considerations is the fact that the framers and
ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment, or at least the Anti-Federalists who demanded a
Bill of Rights, understood the common law as differing by State.3 They saw the
Fourth Amendment as a method of asserting local control of search-and-seizure
policy as against the new central government by requiring that federal agents
follow state law when searching and seizing.33' Among other methods of doing
this, the Amendment preserves common-law tort actions against federal officials
for violating local norms when they search and seize.33' These tort actions were
based on state law and thus might vary by State.
Looking to state law, including state and local custom, will help courts
decide difficult cases. While there might be easy cases where local variation is
unlikely-it is doubtful that peeking through a bedroom window at 2 am. is
acceptable anywhere-tbe law is built on the hard cases, not the easy ones.
Jardines is one such case. The very fact that the Court split 5-4 in that case is
perhaps a clue that the question is not amenable to a simple answer satisfactory to
320 million people spread across fifty States. After all, when the Court in McKee v.
Gratz wrote that "[a] license may be implied from the habits of the country,"o a
line repeated in Jardines," it surely used "country" in its more colloquial sense to
mean "region," the first definition provided in the Webster's Dictionary in use at
the time, rather than the Nation as a whole.342
The first place to look in such cases is state positive law. In many cases, local
police need only familiarize themselves with local law to determine whether their
conduct will run afoul of the Fourth Amendment Local judges and the lawyers
who litigate before them will have an understanding of local positive law sufficient
to determine an answer when there is one. But, as in Jardines, there sometimes will
be no positive law on point. What to do in that situation?
The answer is to fall back on that centuries-old mechanism for deciding close
cases: the jury. A local jury of twelve citizens is the best measure we have for
determining local custom regarding the metes and bounds of our security against
intrusion on our persons, houses, papers, and effects where positive law is unclear.
This was true at common law. Where a local custom was alleged, it was treated as a
question of fact to be determined by a jury like any other such question.343
' See Baude & Stern, supra note 136, at 1854.
3 See Mannheimer, supra note 138, at 1268-74; Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and
Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOwA L. REv. 69, 111-20 (2012).
a See Mannheimer, supra note 141, at 294-98; see also Mannheimer, supra note 138, at 1284-87.
' See Amar, supra note 141, at 774.
m McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922).
* Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013).
342 LAIRD & LEE'S WEBSTER'S NEw STANDARD DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUABG 86
(1920) (defining "country" as "region" or "rural region").
1 '3 See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 163, at *76 (observing that the existence of a particular custom
and its applicability to the dispute must ordinarily be pleaded and proved to a jury). Even after such
proof, however, the court had to make a determination as to the legal validity of the custom. See id at
*76-79.
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This approach allows us to retain some of the benefits of the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy approach. First, it allows Fourth Amendment law to
recognize interests that communities generally recognize but that, for whatever
reason, have not adequately been expressed in positive law. Katz also allows Fourth
Amendment search doctrine to keep pace with changes in technology. Often, these
changes occur so rapidly that they outpace the ability of positive law to keep up.
Where social expectations have formed, but positive law is still murky or
nonexistent, Katz fills the gap.
At the same time, adding a jury mechanism to the Fourth Amendment search
inquiry allows us to maintain these benefits while ameliorating Katz's worst flaws:
its disregard of text and history, its circularity, and its undemocratic nature." First,
as noted above, jury determination of the liability of government officials for
unreasonable searches and seizures was contemplated by the framers, for the
Fourth Amendment was originally understood as preserving state common-law tort
actions against federal officials who violated state search-and-seizure rules."
Moreover, unlike the Katz test, a model that utilizes juries in close cases avoids
circularity by tying Fourth Amendment interests to the law outside the Fourth
Amendment itself. Finally, and most importantly, engrafting the jury into the
Fourth Amendment search inquiry helps resolve the counter-majoritarian difficulty
by taking unelected federal judges out of the business of divining the reasonable
expectations of privacy of ordinary people, and instead directly asks the people
themselves. A system in which juries determine local custom that informs their
privacy expectations would be profoundly democratic because it is bottom-up, not
top-down.m
Entrusting the Fourth Amendment search inquiry to a jury where positive law
provides no clear answer sounds like a novel approach. Yet this Article is hardly
the first to suggest it. The last two decades have seen a surge of scholarship touting
the jury's historic role as a populist and democratic organ of our criminal justice
system.347 Some of this scholarship has specifically advocated involving the jury in
34 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); supra notes 130-144
and accompanying text.
m See supra text accompanying notes 337-339.
"David J. Bederman, The Bederman Lecture on Law and Jurisprudence: Public Law and Custom,
61 EMORY L.J. 949, 949-50 (2012) ("Custom ... is a bottom-up dynamic, where legal rules are being
made by the actual participants in the relevant legal community."); see also Steven Hetcher, The Jury's
Out: Social Norms' Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. LJ. 633, 634 (2003) ("Lcgal
centralists wrongly focus on top-down, formal explanations of the source of entitlements at the expense
of bottom-up explanations that would take into account the causal impacts of informal social norms,
such as those that might flow from the deliberations of jurics."); Rose, supra note 166, at 742
("[C]ustom is the method through which an otherwise unorganized public can order its affairs
authoritatively.").
347 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 81-118
(1998); LAURA I. APPLEMAN , DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNrrY, AND THE CONSTITIflON
13-38 (2015); Nathan Chapman, The Jury's Constitutional Judgment, 67 ALA. L. REv. 189, 201-04,
237-38 (2015); Lauren M. Ouziel, Beyond Law and Fact: Jury Evaluation of Law Enforcement, 92
NorRE DAME L. REv. 691, 729-33 (2016).
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the determination of Fourth Amendment issues.48 Some have even advocated the
creation of the "suppression jury," a jury specially impaneled to determine
suppression issues." Scholars have recognized that "the judiciary is poorly suited
to determine rules of social convention" such as those involved in cases decided
under Katz because "[s]ocial norms are fluid, constantly changing, and difficult to
pin down."3 o It turns out that the problem with Katz is not so much the test but the
test-taker. In close cases at least, it should be juries, not judges. In Jardines, for
example, the five Justice majority concluding that the dog sniff was a search and
the four Justice bloc concluding that it was not were both wrong. Instead of telling
us whether it was a search, the Court should have asked us by assigning that
decision to a local jury."'
Jury determination of the Fourth Amendment search question, at least in close
cases, is also consistent with the way we determine what speech is protected by the
First Amendment in obscenity cases. Both the determination of whether a work
"appeals to the prurient interest" and is "patently offensive"352 must be made
applying "'contemporary community standards'"35s And the Court has recognized
that those "community standards" will, of course, vary by community, and that it is
perfectly acceptable for jurors to apply the standards of their respective
communities.35 4 As a consequence, First Amendment protection can vary by state
and even by locality.355
But decentralizing Fourth Amendment search doctrine need not always be
based on geographic boundaries. Our activity online, for example, has been around
long enough for certain related norms to develop, but they have developed in an
age when state borders have become less important. It may be, then, that the
m See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, A Case for Jury Determination of Search and Seizure Law, 15 U.
RICH. L. REv. 791 (1981); Erik Luna, The Katz Jury, 41 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 839, 850-56 (2008);
Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REv. 849, 877-87 (2014); George C.
Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth
Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REv. 147, 150-51 (1993).
' Thomas & Pollack, supra note 348, at 182-87; see also Luna, supra note 348, at 865-70
(exploring but not advocating this idea).
3- Note, sqpra note 295, at 1635.
3" Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Jardines, said just about as much in a fit of
extrajudicial candor. "I just hate Fourth Amendment cases. I think it's almost a jury question-whether
this variation is an unreasonable search and seizure; variation 3,542." THE SUPREME COURT: A C-SPAN
BOOK FEATURING THE JUSTICES IN THEIR OwN WoRDS 64 (Brian Lamb, Susan Swain & Mark Farkas
eds., 2010) (interview ofJustice Scalia).
11 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973).
mId (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,230 (1972)); see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564,
576 n.7 (2002).
m See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974) ("The result of the Miller cases . .. as a
matter of constitutional law ... is to permit a juror sitting in obscenity cases to draw on knowledge of
the community or vicinage from which he comes in deciding what conclusion 'the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would reach in a given case.").
m1 See Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Know Your Audience: Risky Speech at the Intersection
of Meaning and Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 35 Loy. L.A. Ewr. L. REv. 141, 154-55
(2015) ("[Jjurors in different regions of the country or a state may come to different conclusions on
whether the same material is obscene." (quoting Iowa v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Iowa 2009)
(alteration added)).
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guideposts we look to in determining the contours of computer searches are the
general norms of online activity, rather than those of particular jurisdictions. While
these norms have been influenced from above by national decision-makers, they
have also been influenced from below, by private companies and individuals
heavily involved in online activity.' A measure of decentralization in this and
perhaps similar contexts can take place by subject matter rather than by
jurisdiction.
Again, there are analogues in the development of common-law doctrine. For
example, the ler mercatoria, or law merchant, was historically seen as a "local"
branch of common law developed by those involved in commercial activity.3"
Blackstone described this system of customs as "different from the general rules of
the common law ... yet ingrafted into it."' In the middle ages, once trade began
taking place beyond the borders of a borough and even across national boundaries,
disputes could not be settled by reference to law and custom that had developed
purely to address local issues like land ownership and use."s Merchants, who best
understood commercial activity and had a heightened interest in an efficient
commercial system, developed their own laws and customs to govern such
transactions.' The development of norms in cyberspace seems directly analogous
to the ostensible medieval development of this branch of law created by and
applicable to merchants."' While the conventional view of a uniform le
mercatoria has recently come under attack as a misreading of history,362 it still
provides a useful model for the recognition of a set of norms that revolves around a
particular subject matter rather than geography and that can inform Fourth
Amendment search doctrine.
These preliminary thoughts comprise general brushstrokes, not detailed
blueprints, on how the Fourth Amendment search inquiry might be conducted in
the future. More fine-tuned proposals can be built upon this foundation. But
'See Hetcher, supra note 346, at 634-35 n.10 ("[E]merging wcbsite privacy norms have been
extensively shaped by norm proselytizers from below and the Federal Trade Commission and Congress
from above.").
3 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 163, at *75 (referring to the law merchant as "a particular system
of customs used only among one set of the king's subjects").
' ld; see also PLUCKNErr, supra note 167, at 314 (observing that the law merchant "became the
unified custom of a particular class, that of the merchants").
' See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L REv. 1367, 1389-90 (1996).
3 See id
" See 1. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace, " 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 993,
1019-25 (1994); Johnson & Post, supra note 359, at 1389 ("Perhaps the most apt analogy to the rise of a
separate law of Cyberspace is the origin of the Law Merchant . . . ."); Joel R. Reidcnber& Lex
Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REV. 553,
553-54 (1998) ("For the information infrastructure, default ground rules are just as essential for
participants in the Information Society as Lex Mercatoria was to merchants hundreds of ycars ago.").
' See, e.g., Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX L. REv. 1153, 1158
(2012) (asserting that custom in the commercial world was, like custom generally, primarily local in
nature); Stephen E. Sachs, From St Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval 'Law
Merchant, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 685, 768-80 (2006) ("Lex Mercatoria does not present mercantile
law as an entirely independent legal system... instead, it was highly dependent on the English
common law.. ..").
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whatever form the inquiry takes, the questions we have seen-how intensely a
person's duffle bag can be fondled, how long one can linger at another's doorstep
without knocking, whether one can enter a home at the invitation of one resident
but over the objection of the other-seem to implicate spontaneous order, not
central planning.
CONCLUSION
Custom forms a bridge between social norms and positive law. In much the
same way, custom provides an accommodation between the reasonable expectation
of privacy test and a trespass-based approach. At the very least, courts ought to see
the deep connections between the two approaches and recognize that they are really
just different manifestations of the same basic inquiry. More profoundly, this
recognition could lead to significant changes in the way we conceive of the Fourth
Amendment search inquiry: more heavily influenced by underlying law, variable
by state, and determined in some cases by juries.
